Aspects of the Transcendental Phenomenology of Language

Abstract:
Transcendental phenomenology of language wrestles with the relationship of language to mind’s manifestation of being. Of special interest is the sense in which language is, like one’s embodiment, a medium of manifestation. Not only does it permit sharing the world because words as worldly things embody meanings that can be the same for everyone; not only does speaking manifest to others the common world from the speaker’s perspective; but also speaking, as a meaning to say, may achieve the manifestation of the world also for the speaker herself. This requires finding the right words to form true propositions in a well-formed sentences. The manifest telos of proposition-rendering sentences is adumbrated and founded in the infant’s elemental formation of simple phonemic identity syntheses and syntax. This instictual dynamism is founded in what Husserl names “the idea of truth” which supports the thesis of a universal language instinct.

Keywords:
Husserl, Sokolowski, manifestation, truth, teleology, proposition, instinct

1. Introduction
In this essay we wish to focus on the relation of being and manifestation and in particular linguistic manifestation. The necessity of manifestation, and its own manifestation, are of special interest for transcendental phenomenology. This is especially so if we have reason to think of manifestation as a kind of medium. The way language manifests is inseparable from the core concerns of transcendental phenomenology. However, if transcendental phenomenology relents to the pull of metaphysics, for example to the issues of the inherent intelli-
gibility of being and the convertibility of being and the true, then the ancient great themes of \textit{Logos}, \textit{Nous}, and \textit{Eidos} or the luminousness of intelligibility press in upon the phenomenology of language.

The more accessible beginning studies of language as a system of interrelated signs, which may be studied objectively and in comparison with other such ethnic-linguistic systems, itself has essential philosophical interests. This is because this systemic sense of language is connected to the metaphysics of \textit{Logos} and abstracting it from this, for example treating it as a taxonomical entity by itself in the world, along with rocks, trees, microbes and so forth, misses the essential. This is not only because language is a product of historical rational individual persons, but also because it exercises a normative and distinctive causal influence on the life of these persons by providing to them necessary rules and norms for rational and successful behavior and communication. As such it is a cultivation of both one’s spiritual life as well as one’s lived bodiliness by which one is in the world with others.

In thinking we think both linguistically and pre-linguistically in numerous and subtle ways. But this is not thematic, indeed language is a kind of medium, a commons which unites and separates and that without which we could not be a community of minds and moral agents. As such a larger social and regulative whole it exists independently of any individual; and yet it is more interior than the oldest habits and enables each, in accord with how gifted she is, to make a modification of this whole. Thus in great measure it is because of language that the world in which we live is not merely the natural cosmos but the life-world, that is, the surroundings which exists on the one hand on its own independently of me, but also within me and by reason of me myself contributing to its distinctive character.\footnote{I have been helped here by Romano Guardini, cited in Ivo Höllhuber, \textit{Sprache – Gesellschaft – Mystik: Prolegomena zu einer pneumatischen Anthropologie} (Munich/Basel: Ernst Reinhardt Verlag, 1963), 46–47.} If one’s bodiliness may be understood as the way one is with, within, and for others in interpreting and changing the world, then one’s linguisticality is a necessary enrichment of one’s bodiliness. It is a cultivation of my embodiment, my fleshly being in the world.

As we shall see, embodiment, whether linguistic or non-linguistic, is in the service of the ineluctable essential determination of our being agents of manifestation of being. It is ineluctable because \textit{showing} it to be otherwise is inconceivable without presupposing it, which is far from saying we never make mistakes. As indispensable, and as interior a medium as language is, nevertheless intellectual consciousness is even more interior for it holds open the very field of manifestness by which absolutely everything comes to light no matter how subtle and muted and marginal, or no matter how overwhelmingly rich, brilliant, complex, and transcendent the subject matter. We will repeatedly return to this theme.

2. Manifestation, Appearing, and Phenomenality

Transcendental phenomenology is metaphysical in so far as its basic claim is the inseparability of being and manifestation. A central issue in this paper and in phenomenology, is the nature of this relationship. Transcendental phenomenology, as understood here, is close to the ancient view that the true is being’s manifestation and intellect is the manifestation of what is true. For phenomenology, the available terms, for example phenomenon, appearing, manifestation, display, discovering, unconcealment and so forth, mean that what is in question is not an inferior or unreliable or non-preferred presentation of being, as in “mere appearing” or even “representation.” (Although important, we will not here pursue the current philosophical topic of whether “consciousness” or the knowing subject as such is to be conceived as one substance remarkably unified with other substances by an epiphenomenal bond or an occult process of phenomenalization in the brain and effecting “representation.” But such a setting easily lends itself to regarding the language of appearing and manifestation with suspi-
Thus the association of “appearing” in English with a questionable form of medium or guise of being, for example a suspicious perhaps opaque or even treacherous “representation,” motivates our choice for using a word like “manifestation” which currently is more neutral.

The transcendental-phenomenological “natural attitude,” as the default and very natural predisposition, suggests the being’s true presence is immediate and without the mediation or medium of the mind’s agency of manifestation. But “the transcendental attitude” holds that this is naïve because there is nothing articulately present in the absence of the mind’s agency of manifestation. The agency of manifestation does not “phenomenalize” being, i.e., reduce what is true to a subjective impression, as in esse est percipi. But this is not at all the equivalent of holding that whatever one says is true is so, or that one’s perceiving is infallible and so forth. But it does say that the absence of truth and the falsity of claims become evident and the truth wins out if and only if it is manifestly so, that is, by truthful manifestation.

Put simply and in exclusively visual-perceptual terms, things, beings, are inseparable from their looks, but how things really look may need reflection, assessment, change of perspective by the one looking. Gestalt reversible pictures, (e.g., seeing the figure as a duck, then as a rabbit, then as a “Gestalt reversible figure”) are useful for making this point. Here we see there is no thingly medium called a manifestation or an appearing. Rather how things look, how they appear, is tied up with, not reduced to, how we “take” things. (The duck-rabbit cannot readily be taken as the square root of 144 or the boiling point of water in Celsius.)

The manifestation of things thus presupposes a prior manifestability, an inherent essential look (eidos) which the agency of manifestation brings to light. Because, we may say with Aristotle, the inherent essential look is itself actually “manifest” only upon illumination there must be a meeting of the eidos and the manifesting light of mind. However, there would seem to be a manifestness which is prior to the agency of manifesting mind and prior to the surroundings to be manifested. For mind to be manifest through a manifesting act, and for the manifesting act to target what is to be manifested, there would seem to be required a prior manifestness, which is anterior to the distinction between manifestation and what is manifested. This medium would be always already known or present but not as manifested, nor as manifested manifesting. And as the condition of the agency of manifestation and the truthfulness of things, it would be a more basic medium than the medium of language. We will return to this.

Transcendental phenomenological philosophy has focused on what is involved in knowing in the most robust sense, indeed, on striving for wisdom, as the knowing of what is most worth having, built on a knowing that cannot not be true. This ancient and contemporary ideal requires conceiving knowing as a matter of the having, presencing, showing, manifesting, appearing and so forth, of the thing itself, in itself, objectively, i.e., such that our presencings are measured by “the thing itself.” This “itself” is present in such a way that what is known about it is not a causal-result of our knowing it; rather its being so displayed reveals the thing truthfully, i.e., as having a proper intelligibility (eidos) not dependent on our act of displaying it. Thus in all knowing there is the ideal (and assumption) of the validity of ourselves as agents of manifestation. There is, furthermore, an at least implicit claim that there is an essential ontological correlation of our minds, and our linguisticality, with the intrinsic intelligibility and truth of things. Manifested real things appear to us as inherent possessors of their own essential truth.

However, the agency of manifestation is the necessary condition for their truth to be brought to light (for us and others). As we said, we are not the agents of the inherent truth of their being, but only of the manifestation of this truth. (Obviously if we are speaking of the truth of other persons, our agency of manifestation is a subordinate necessary condition, that is, one which awaits on the gracious revelation of the person we are interested in.)

The language of manifestation, appearing and so forth, takes its vocabulary primarily from the prime analogue of visible perception within an adequately illuminated “medial” space. However, already in articulated
perceptual, to say nothing of conceptual, illumination we are moving in the realm of manifestation through language where the exemplarity of perceptual illumination as prime analogue is diminished.

By reason of our embodiment the manifestation of the material bodily world around us, including embodied other minds, our intellectual power of manifestation depends on its capacity of receptivity through bodily sensibility. Our bodily sensibility serves in some sense as the media for the initially receptive engagement with the material world around us. Let us briefly recall some elements of the eidetics of linguistic manifestation. Its core is the distinction between empty and filled intentions as the correlate of empty and filled meanings or significations. Language, like perception, has its home in our distinctive intention of something mediated by sensation of what is sensible. We thus distinguish the manifestation of something by way of the kind of meaning-giving act or intentional presencing of the sensible presence in the form of 1) a perception of something, for example this small statue, as a physical object in space and time. Quite in contrast to the straightforward perceptual intention, 2) I may regard this same thing, statue, as indeed a representation or likeness of the former emperor of France, Napoleon. Or 3) perhaps you and I have agreed to regard my placing this statue on the window sill at night as a sign that the coast is clear for our secret adventure. Or 4) perhaps I hear you say of a politician: “He is the modern day embodiment of Napoleon Bonaparte.”

In the first three cases the sensibility is the same, but what is meant is the same (not identical) only in 2) and 4). In 2), 3), and 4), the meant is present in empty intentions whereas in 1) there is a filled intention of the object intended, which happens to be a statue, even though there are necessarily hidden emptyly intended aspects in any presencing of a physical object in space and time. The presently perceived object’s present sides or aspects, (it could be those of a statue), by reason of what perception essentially involves, signify or indicate hidden sides which I can manifest by walking around the thing (e.g., tree or statue). In the case of 2), 3) and 4) one intends something absent by means of something present. In 3) and 4) what is present means something else, something apart from the thing directly made present, by convention, a prior compact and so forth. But in 2) there a natural affinity by way of a similarity between what is absent, what the statue depicts, and what is present, the depiction (statue). Again, this does not hold for cases 3) and 4) where the connection between what is present to sensibility and the meant or its signification is a matter of convention. In 3) we get closer to the meaning of linguistic signification, that is, 4). Of course some languages have pictographs, for example Japanese Kanji, where the written and spoken language has also ingredients wherein the intentionality of picturing or depicting are also in play. But in all four cases the crucial difference is between instances of meaning the intended absent object on the basis of the sensible presence of signs or linguistic expressions (all of which are themselves be directly perceived, but not what they mean), or in directly meaning it in its expression (e.g., as in “you” or “I”) or its physical presence (seeing/perceiving the tree, statue-thing, apple).

A founding aspect of linguistic manifestation is the use of indexicals (or demonstrative pronouns) by which are indicated the substrates for the categorial apprehensions of things. In the categorial apprehensions, the initial seeings-as…, as seeing or hearing this, here, now, as such and such. This itself is typically an identity synthesis, perhaps on the basis of having seen that, there, then looking and behaving similarly and or differently. For example: Consider seeing yesterday a rash on one’s left arm with something like a circle around it; then, early next day reading about certain tics in the woods falling on warm bodies, digging in, and causing skin irritation looking like a bull’s-eye, and effecting the dangerous illness of Lyme Disease; and then looking at one’s arm again and seeing the symmetry with what one read; and then going to a specialist physician one

trusts and hearing: “this is a serious incidence of the beginnings of Lyme Disease and we will have to treat this immediately with...” Here the initial scarcely determinate sensation takes on categoriality and always in the background is the issue of the truthfulness of the categorial interpretation, and this finding its fulfillment in the medical authority’s statement of her views. As Sokolowski put it we may think that any “categorial articulation is by default an affirmation.” Consider how the connection between articulation and affirmation holds “also in depictions, where the arrangement of images is implicitly a claim about ‘how things are.’”

Again, there is an ineluctable assumption of the truthfulness of the agency of manifestation as essentially other than a treacherous or fanciful production of what works in this situation. Eventually such a pragmatic theory will be justified because the truth about the manifestation will have (apparently) emerged, for example that here is Lyme Disease. The theory (proposition) that what is true is what works will, as a theory, show itself to be true because confirmed, not because it is useful. The ground of truth as something’s being true is not to be found in consciousness or a fortiori in the personal interests of the researcher, for example a reward or sense of security, but in the matter itself, that is, the truthful display, which as such is the goal and meaning of inquiry and research. The redundance theory, that the truth of S is p is simply S is p, omits the ineluctable necessity of being’s relationship to manifestation.

Thus the ancient definition of knowing, as knowing truly or as the conformity or assimilation of mind to being is not a matter of an engagement or adjustment through a creative ingenuity by way of a created pragmatic “appearance.” Of course, there is no knowing of things in themselves or knowing of things themselves apart from the appearing of things to us through our conscious agency of manifestation. Errors or false presentations are known as such only through the true manifestations. The things themselves are thus present in the manifestations (appearings, phenomena) which we as agents of manifestation bring about in engaging the world. Again, the manifest intelligibility and truthfulness of things is essentially in correlation with the manifestness and light achieved by ourselves as intellectual agents of manifestation.

Husserl was struck by this miracle or wonder of a correlation of the truthful being of the world and ourselves as agents of manifestation. An ingredient in this is wonder at the obviousness, to the point of almost total hiddenness, of the fact that one’s own consciousness, as manifesting, as well as that of one’s fellows as self-aware agents of manifestation, goes in advance of the world manifested as existing independently already out there now. Of course, there is surely a tautology in saying: “If I were not, there would be for me no world.” But yet there is here “the most wonderful fact,” that the world “which is for me in all of its determinateness, is a unity which presents itself in my subjective experiences, and this world which presents itself in the occurring ‘presentations’ is not to be released from this correlation.”

3. Speaking as Manifesting

A paraphrase of (a translation from) Cicero may serve as an introduction to the familiar theme that speaking is intrinsic to showing or manifesting: “Because each speech consists of the thing itself and the word, so neither can the words maintain their essential position, if one removes the thing itself, nor can the things themselves


keep their light if you remove the words.” Reason and language together, but also in different ways, function as agents of manifestation of truth, wherein truth may be seen as the telos of linguistic articulation. One of the central issues in the phenomenology of language is whether all senses of manifestation or phenomenality are tied to concepts which in turn are tied to language.

Surely, at some stage of the maturation of rational consciousness, identity syntheses occur prior to and apart from words and the unities, samenesses, and identities found in language wherein a robust sense of identity occurs. Robert Sokolowski shows how the infant’s cooing and babbling stage moves through continuous vowel sounds into consonants, from similarities and samenesses into the eventual apprehensions of the very same as before. With this constitution of phonemes we have strict identities, and thus selections of alternatives opposed to others. Here the first logical achievements occur of the distinction between an “object” and how it is taken. Similarly there are wordless infant retentions/memories and seeings-as, e.g., this face appears, we adults might say for the child, “as the same as the one who kissed me earlier.” Eventually, linguistic expressions are joined to thoughts in a more intrinsic way. Indeed, words and kinds of sentences (and other conventional signs as directional signals) eventually themselves seem to be invested with meaning, thereby granting them the status of “objective spirit” with a quasi-intentionality demanding that the minds confronting these linguistic-or sign-units respond back with the appropriate meaning-giving acts.

Such a functioning of language reminds us of usages wherein language is not declarative, revelatory or descriptive but does something and brings something into the world. We now call these “performatives,” for example commands, expressions of disgust, solemn acts, e.g., as those of forgiveness and promises, holy rituals as “This is My Body,” said at the Catholic Mass and so forth. In all these cases, what is most significant in the speaking is not describing but doing, creating, or acting. For example, promises bring about rights and obligations that never existed before. Indeed the expression of the declarative sentence itself is a doing. The linking of S to p by “is” a declaration that the speaker, in say “is” cannot be in error, and thus, by implication, the listener may count on this (see footnote 22 below).

It hardly needs demonstration that declarative sentences by a speaker or writer manifest something for the listener or reader. This is how some spend good parts of their days, even their lives. This is how we learn, inform, and express our agreements and disagreements. And it is perhaps especially in the latter instance that an important sense of speaking as clarification arises that we might overlook. This is, in part, because one often speaks with friends simply in order to commune and make contact by merely saying, even repeating, the obvious. Here one may also speak in order to share with others what one already knows or to share in another’s actual knowledge. But occasionally speaking can be, and is, clarifying for the one speaking, and who, prior to the saying of what is to be said, may be, indeed, in an important respect must be, ignorant of what she thinks about the matter in question. (Here and throughout, we will use the activity of speaking or saying, when ceteris paribus what we have to say is applicable to writing or typing.)

Within the phenomenological tradition we have the work for example of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Robert Sokolowski, and Eugene Gendlin, showing the intricacies of the linguistic process of

6) Robert Sokolowski, Presence and Absence: A Philosophical Investigation of Language and Being (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 67–73. His presentation is so rich that this compressed version borders on distortion.
manifesting the world which, eventually, takes form in judgments expressed in sentences. Whether non-linguistic forms of world-manifestation, for example a painting or symphony, can dispense with sentences will not be pursued here. Seeing-as, concept formation and acquisition, and then predication of concepts to subject-substrates may be described in terms of our conscious act-life. One may ask: Do not the meaning-giving acts, the pre- and conceptual-seeings-as, and the judgments happen on their own, pre- or non-linguistically, and is not the linguistic expression an “accidental dress” for the thought in play, and that truth of the matter has the meaning of actual validity of the thought, apart from the dress?8

Numerous issues here will be familiar especially to students of Husserl, but there is one of particular importance for our central theme of language as a medium of manifestation. Is the interplay of language and thought not always a matter of giving words to what one has already known or thought? Or rather is it sometimes at least9 more a case that the very emergence of the sentences derives from a motion from a potential knowing, a “wanting to say” of what is only implicitly known, that is, from a unique kind of ignorance in the form of an empty intention, to the actual knowing through a filling of this intention, that is, in the explication of this felt meaning of wanting to say with the right words? If so, here clarity happens only with the functioning of language, that is, with the emergent (right) words and syntax. One subsequently may say: I really did not know what I thought about this issue until I put it into words. Thus the words were not merely means to already finished thoughts and beliefs, but it is only through the finding the right words that one becomes aware of what one really thinks and believes.

Antecedent to the linguistic achievement in specific words whether nouns, verbs, adjectives or adverbs, there is a pre-linguistic, but, as we shall see, not pre-rational-linguistic dimension. (Of course, in adults one may not say that it is absolutely pre-linguistic.) Husserl refers to this stage as a “wanting to say” as a unique empty intention (Meinen) of ein dunkles Etwas, “an empty intention, a moment in which the direction of our attention is to something completely dark, but still conscious,” a wordless knowing, which is indeed often a unique anticipatory true knowing while not actually knowing. But here clearly the intention is not one aiming at wordless thoughts, but one aiming at propositions embodied in statements. When so speaking out loud I am thereby also both listener and one understanding. And I hear what I have to say and think in such a way that I hear and learn what I actually wanted to say.10 What I wanted to say is a (true) proposition which numerous sentences, paraphrases and translations can capture, indeed might be necessary to adequately capture.

Eugene Gendlin refers to it as a “felt-meaning”: “something is there,” perhaps a feeling somewhere in the lived body. He has developed a rich theory of psychotherapy, as well as a theory of creativity, from this experience of the transition from the emergent dynamic pre-linguistic felt-meaning to its explication. His discussions confirm Husserl’s that there is here a unique kind of transition from an empty to a filled intention. And he shows how both the thinker and the client (to the delight of the therapist who has been urging attention to the felt-meaning) experience in the finding the right words a relief, indeed a special joy. Often both the client and the thinker experience themselves as “stuck” and find no “break-through” because the right words cannot flow. Unsuspected resistances or obstacles can be in play. Thus, for example, the client may walk into the therapy

9) For this cautionary qualifying point and several others I am indebted to John Maraldo’s close reading of this paper.
10) For all this see: Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen Ergänzungsband Erster Teil, Husserliana XX/I, ed. Ullrich Melle (Dordrecht: Springer, 2002), e.g. 85–86., https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0599-9_1; and Logische Untersuchungen Ergänzungsband Zweiter Teil, e.g., 76–77. Throughout I am dependent also on Robert Sokolowski’s Presence and Absence, especially Chapters 8 and 9, where the central role of propositions in speaking/writing and grammar in general is worked out.
session initially having diagnosed her plight as one of depression. After spending time with the “felt-meaning” that was underneath this term, “depression,” she might open up to quite different avenues and find, for example, that she is angry because of her friend’s betrayal.¹¹

Donald Davidson makes an observation along similar lines when he observes that the experience of not finding the right word “does not require postulating a pre-existing internal but wordless message striving to find its translation into a spoken idiom.” But his “not finding the right word” seems to embrace both the “tip of the tongue” memory lapses as well as the Husserl/Gendlin case when he says: We simply sometimes cannot access the right words we already know, and in as much as we already have a language “we are able to think of new things that need saying.”¹² Davidson does not notice the unique status of the felt-meaning and “wanting-to-say” which, at least when the speaker is exploring or even rehearsing a complex issue, goes in advance of all sentences and is the inner guide for the speaker’s sense of the right words and sentences, and the sense of discovery upon saying it satisfactorily: “Yes, this is what I want to say, this is what I think, about the matter.” Again throughout the movement of clarification, which must be distinguished from a movement toward realizing rhetorical interests in the service of power, prejudice and so forth. In the latter case “right word” means in the service of one’s practical interests; in the case of clarification, truth is the motor. Merely useful, clever, agreeable words, formulations and so forth, will not do. In the authentic effort to understand and clarify one is not soothed with what is not true, and the truth is pursued for itself and is not my clever or capricious creation.

4. Some Formal Features of the Teleology of Truthful Presencing

Throughout our perceptual life, as well as in the situation of speaker or writer, we find a basic teleology of presencing and articulation which moves from a kind of empty to a filled intention. Again, we may of course be in familiar situations with ready-at-hand conventional formulae that one uses for the purpose of carrying on a conversation or even calling attention to aspects of the common surrounding, but here is communing of presences, often “small-talk,” which may fulfill a major social function, rather than the manifestation of the world for and with one another. Because truth is the entelechy of the life of the mind, it is there present from the start and as the telos, and truth is embodied in stated propositions, Husserl early on generalized that “theoretical research,” but also implicitly all authentic efforts of clarification, even if not “pursued in explicit acts or in complete statements, nevertheless terminates ultimately in statements.”¹³ For example: a) in psychotherapy’s transition from the felt-meaning to finding the right word; b) in speaking’s moving from wanting, meaning to say, to saying what one wants to say, where, in the state of wanting is merely a potential and only a predelineated actual knowing folded into a felt-meaning, which Husserl calls a dark something.

Before attending to these efforts at clarification let us attend to c) that is, the movement beyond the

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¹¹) See the website, Focusing.org.; there one can find his important “Thinking at the Edge,” and “A Theory of Personality Change,” originally in P. Worcel and D. Byrne, ed., Personality Change, (New York: Wiley, 1964). Some of Eugene Gendlin’s basic books are: Focusing Oriented Psychotherapy (New York/London: Guilford Press, 1996); Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning (Glencoe: Free Press, 1962). In both Husserl and Gendlin, what we have resembles and differs from both Plato’s anamnesis and “the tip of the tongue” experience, wherein we have instances of “forgetfulness.”


puzzling experiencing of something ambiguous where the significance for example of this rash, is missing, toward the moment where I perceive the rash as indicating Lyme Disease. In finding the right category, whether on the basis of one’s own experience or that of someone else who knows, one moves toward a clarifying goal: The possible emergence of X as a is completed with seeing X is a. In matters of consequence, intending something emptily as in experiencing a puzzling vague uncertainty or in the opinion of someone whom one knows to be unexperienced there is an incomplete experience. I might have played with taking X as a but I remain uncertain and await the revelation “X is a.” Here the “is” is not merely a possible linking of X and a, as a result of my first noticing the rash. Rather, it, on the basis of my checking all the other criteria, itch, color, circle shape and so forth, and then, finally, in accepting the trusted physician’s confirmation of X is a, where the “is” is declarative and implies the performative preface, “it is true that (X is a), and I am in a position to know.” The expert’s declaration does not add any perceptual ingredient to the perception but my perception as a moment of knowing reaches a completion. One may have “complete perceptions” in much of one’s life which are disconnected from issues of coherence, truth, consequence and so forth. Often here the issues of “knowing” and wider significance are believed to be unnecessary, impractical and so forth; e.g., one believes that Lyme Disease occurs only to other people. Pursuing the completion requires that “X is a” be a matter of importance practically or theoretically. In the latter case, the immediate intuition of X as a must be momentarily disengaged so that the link of X and a be proposed as something for our assent, as when it is reported, or put in quotes, or asked as a question. Then we pursue it to its end and we are able to see, to presence in a filled way, the being a of X, and thus to assent to what before was the emptily intended proposition, “X is a”. The original link of X as a reaches its completion, and its truth “is seen” in the filling intuition which grounds the assent to the proposition as expressed in the sentence “X is a.”

Because c) may be subsumed for the most part under b) if c) is regarded as a moment of a wider disposition to knowing, clarification, coherence and so forth, we want now to discuss how “saying what one means,” (or linguistically explicating a felt-meaning) similarly is a form of the emergence of truth as the completion of a process. The guiding empty intending of what one wants to say is an intending of, a meaning to say, something which one does not properly, fully, know but still “knows,” (e.g., the speaker may hear an interlocutor restate or rephrase what one has said and say: “No, putting it that way isn’t quite right because…”). The empty intending, as the proper guide and source of what one wants to say, leads, lures, to the full statement in the form of it as “being-just-so,” correct, right. Thus this source is what one lets guide one’s struggle with the correct nouns, the correct property-ascription of the nouns, and the correct syntax. The right word(s) for this sentence yield the telos of a proposition; the speaker will know when she has finally reached it. But she too will also learn this when her speaking involves her interlocutors who agree or challenge it. As such the expressed proposition is a kind of ideal which might take numerous sentences, paraphrases, translations and so forth, to state – except perhaps in the case of a genius poet who may seem to capture all the sentences in one, so that subsequent readers and writers will be tempted to identify the proposition(s) with saying it this way, believing it cannot be said in any other way.

It is worth restating that although what is meant has a linguistic layer, what one intends, what the mind targets, that is, the proposition, is the meant in the pre-linguistic intuited mode of how the judgment is to be made in the form of a statement; what is meant is not an expressed statement with an already fixed linguistic form guiding the formation of the proposition. Indeed it is the former which exercises constraint on the words, not vice-versa. Thus, just as in walking I might be said to move myself to my goal by moving my feet, so in speaking or writing the truth about this issue, I put into play my “organs of speech” or apply my typing skills

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to my computer keyboard. In both latter cases, I immediately intend the proposition, what I want to say. In the one case I do it through the mediation of my organs of speech and in the other through my arm muscles and finger tips. But we would misconstrue the essential were we to reduce what is said or explain what is said or written through the physical, neural-physiological causality of the bodily mediation, although doubtless there is this causality from brain to bodily execution. Is this misconstrual not equivalent to attributing the change in the world occasioned by a great philosopher or poet to the ink and shape of the letters printed on the paper upon which she wrote? (We will return to this theme of an “organ of speech” later.)

Husserl calls attention to another way in which our engagement with manifesting through signs may become side-tracked. The manipulation of the signs can doubtless facilitate our apprehension of that to which the signs refer. Here we have to do with the wonder of techné whereby devices for changing and understanding the world create the temptation to confuse the meant (noema) of the “technological device” itself with the purpose or reality for which the device was devised. In which case, and so understood, technology in its essence at once provides advantages by facilitating a result; but at the same time it occludes its disadvantages. “Sound-bites,” political slogans, and money are obvious examples in everyday life. In arithmetic this may be a matter of confusing the signs or symbols for the arithmetic idealities themselves, die Sachen selbst, which the signs signify: one may take the signs for numbers for the number-reality (i.e., ideality) itself. At the same time this may be a matter of taking the successfully devised procedures which facilitate and expedite the result for the actual authentic engagement with the numerical reality.

An example of inauthentic engagement with numerical reality is when someone who has previously learned that there are 47 trees in the yard, says he “sees” 47 trees. In fact one can perhaps authentically see a certain small number, perhaps 4, but surely not 47. Another example is having “learned by rote the multiplication tables,” and thereby claiming to “know” that 8 is the square root of 64 or $7 \times 8$ is 56. There is an inauthenticity evident in “learning arithmetic” when one merely learns procedures or operations with the signs, for example memorizing multiplication tables. (Calculating machines may also serve as an example.) In such cases if this is all one is capable of one does not really do arithmetic because one does not grasp the arithmetic ideal meaning-content of the procedures even though he is taught and persuaded he does.

Yet we noted that Husserl argues that we cannot simply regard the linguistic expression as a non-necessary accidental clothing for thoughts, as if when the clothes were taken away we would have the “naked thoughts” for themselves next to the clothing. This is in part made evident through how speech enables the empty intention of “wanting to say” to become a filled intention of having said it right; with this one now knows what one thinks in a more explicit way than before.

Truth as a true proposition functions as the telos of statements which serve as the fulfillment of perceptions. Truth here as the ideal of presencing is bound to the formation of propositions which itself is bound to the formation of concepts as ways of informing our experiences of being. Indeed because the predicative “is” is founded on the achievement of “as” which itself, at some stage (which we can only reconstruct and not relive), must build on the prior pre-conceptual presence of “something there.” But this presence is a pre-predicative

15) Ibid.


17) Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Ergänzungsband, Zweiter Teil, 22.
“is,” and not (yet) the “is” that achieves a true judgment, not “a being,” not a singular verbal noun, and certainly not yet the metaphysician’s “being as being.”¹⁸

At some stage we have to account for the discretion, the manifoldness, and plurality of being in the form of beings emergent out of the continuous unity of being which one may render present as the gerund or verbal noun, “being.” The original non-discrete sense of what Husserl calls an “interest in being” and where we (adults) might say “there is something/being, not nothing,” is the ground level upon which language emerges. Seemingly for the infant the background will normally be suffused (by force of needs and “instincts” – see below) with the distinct bodily presences, faces, shapes and sounds of significant others. These sources of sounds, smells, shapes, movements, all of which will involve elemental identity syntheses, become the focal points that cradle the indefinite continuous background of being. Elementary identity syntheses precede or found the presence of relevant shapes, sounds, and faces that usher in the building blocks of language learning, foremost, phonemes and names. Out of these the higher-order semantic and syntactic meanings arise. Language’s foundation in phonemes or discrete sound units, like “eeeh”, “oooh”, and “ahhh”, manifests a sameness and duration in spite of the difference of times, places, speaker, pitch, timbre and so forth. This parallels the achievement of “naming” which enhances the senses of both identity and difference from out of the more or less continuous background of sounds, sights, colors, shapes and so forth.¹⁹

The learning of the “language games” which enables naming, for example learning “showing by pointing,” and then the significance of specific sounds, smiles and so forth, all involve an identity synthesis of identity syntheses. Thus one learns to attend for example not to the finger’s interesting visual features or scents, but to the significant other’s beckoning one’s attention through her extended finger; that is, grasping it as pointing. Here moments of “the game” of pointing come together: the singling out the extended index finger, not a hair, knuckle or nail; taking this finger as pointing. Then comes the final phase of “the game”: the successful matching of the gaze with that to which the finger points; then hearing and repeating the word in association with the target of the finger; and then sharing in the good cheer and festivities which follow upon the success of repeating the word in relation to the naming of what the mother’s finger targets. This game of pointing is a synthetic identity-whole bringing together various parts which themselves are identity syntheses.

More basic than the game of “pointing” is learning phonemes. As we have seen, in these elemental sound units we have an interplay of more or less strong identities amidst differences. The phonemic sameness and identity in the flow of difference and otherness of pitch, person, spatial location is different from the infant’s finding the sameness and identity of moving bodies where their seeming to become increasingly large (by coming closer) does not mean a manifestation of a different body, that is, one that is (always) large rather than small; and this is different than the identity synthesis involved in naming the flower, the cat, the cat’s tail, the motion of the tail, the cat’s moving its tail and so forth, in different instances of places times, sizes, colors, kinds and so forth.

Following perhaps upon the streaming of more or less continuous sounds (which adults may refer to as verbal nouns like hummings, hissings, and cooings), we begin to constitute phonemes and names, and modify them with endless adjectives and refer to them with pronouns; and then we learn to link nouns and describe their actions and then find words that specify them. The learning to say something in the sense of saying something about something, the achievement of propositions through sentences, itself expands into the possibility of

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¹⁹ Sokolowski, Presence and Absence, especially Chapters 1–3, upon which this compressed discussion is dependent.
for example modifications of declarative sentences into names standing for sentences (“the First Amendment”) or symbolizations or formalizations (“1A” for “First Amendment”) of particular sentences. We learn very early that sentences can be modified into different instances or versions of the same proposition. Thus a declarative sentence may become a question, command, plea, oath, quotation, a subordinate clause in another declarative sentence and so forth. Early on there emerge experiences explicated best by “impersonal constructions” as “it is raining,” “there is...,” “es gibt...,” which mirrors the original gerundial sense of “to be”/”being” where “it” (or “es”) does not stand for a discrete subject and where the subject may be a verbal noun, as “walking.”

All these linguistically and pre-linguistically mediated manifestations, as Sokolowski shows, can be analyzed as forms of presentation and presentability. In the very core of manifestation, wherein there is a coincidence of presentation and presentability, there are to be found interplayings of constitutive formal transcendental-ontological couples: presence/absence, identity/difference, rest/motion, sameness/otherness. The interplay of these couples are the necessary and essential elements of all acts of manifestation, and most certainly those acts which involve linguistic achievements. Although rarely rendered explicit, they are manifestly in play in, and the essential presupposition of, the learning of language, and indeed any learning at all. As essential considerations for the manifestation of being, they are at the core of metaphysics as First Philosophy.

Thus in this respect the basics of learning itself cannot be learned in as much as our consciousness as an agency of manifestation is a teleology of presencing informed essentially by the interplay of the constitutive transcendental-ontological couples of identity/difference, rest/motion, presence/absence and sameness/otherness. The telos of the truthful clarification in the presencing of something itself illustrates a most important instance of the interplay of the couples.

5. Instinctual Origin of Language

The transcendental phenomenology of language highlights a teleology of identity and unity of identities and unities inherent in the clarification of the world and/or being. This can be shown to be the case with language not yet being explicitly in play – even though, obviously, the phenomenological explication of this is thoroughly linguistic. For Husserl, the core of this consideration is that every “verification” is progress toward the all of truth and toward the self-actualization and preservation of the I as an agent of truthful manifestation. Indeed every “truthful” filling of an intention of what was meant in its absence as it was meant in its absence (in its being proposed as true) is within the horizon of the ideal (or Idea) of the all of truth and the apperceived ideal of the universal transcendental I as the subject of all truths. This transcendental idea (which is both regulative and constitutive) is transcendental

20) On impersonal verbs, see: Sokolowski, Presence and Absence, 17–19.
21) This is a key thesis of Sokolowski’s Presence and Absence, which is the most original and important metaphysical work in transcendental phenomenology after Husserl and Heidegger.
22) See especially in: Edmund Husserl, Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie, Husserliana XLI, ed. Rochus Sowa and Thomas Vongehr (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 160–170. In H.W.B. Joseph’s In Introduction to Logic (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966 [1906]), 163–170. We find a good case for not underappreciating the metaphysical significance of the verb to be as sign of predication, not only because so many languages have agreed to use it, but because every judgment does imply existence, but not necessarily the existence of the subject of the sentence (these may be, e.g., logical or fictional), but of the universe of being in which this state of affairs has a place. (Cf. Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ theory of intellectual light as a directedness to a sense of being that is indifferent to its modalities: Das Sein [Munich: Kösel, 1957], especially 136.) While it is clear that the distinguishing characteristic of a judgment is that it is true or false the person who makes a judgment, unless he says what he does not really think, says what he thinks to be true, and therefore intends to declare the truth. All judgments, therefore, besides affirming or denying a predicate of a subject implicitly affirm themselves as true. And, following F.H. Bradley, we might say that while making a judgment we cannot entertain the possibility of its error. If we are hesitant we say so and do not make an unconditional judgment. A lie, therefore is not a judgment but an action which uses
to the transcendence of the world and immanent to all passive and active achievements of the primal as well as mundane-personal I’s. (The theological dimensions of this “divine entelechy” is merely mentioned here.)

The linguistic aspect of the teleology of presencing is evident in the earliest stages of human consciousness. Indeed language and language learning seem as automatic and natural as what we call any instinct which one may ascribe to a human infant. For example, it is as natural as being drawn toward the face of the one mothering and the interest in sucking the breast. Because language behavior surfaces at the earliest stages of human consciousness, Steven Pinker has proposed that there is a “language instinct.” Evidence for such is for example that phonemes of one’s mother tongue begin to be learned in utero; sentences emerge after a year or two; by three years “most children glibly generate sentences and have the basic grammar of their environment.” In addition, aborigine languages are as complex and complete as those of “developed cultures”; and after about eight years the well-known facility of language-learning seems to vanish and after this age one has to go through the arduous process of learning a “second” non-native tongue.

Furthermore, Noam Chomsky has argued that there undergirds language (i.e., apparently all known languages) a universal deep grammar that exercises constraints on the linkage, syntax, structures of predication of our empirical languages. For Chomsky these constraints are “not accessible to consciousness.” He illustrates this by way of analogy: Consider how someone may conclude an argument which is indeed an argument of modus ponens, but of which the speaker has no inkling of its being as such in play in his discussion. Chomsky clarifies that not only does the speaker cognize facts and “the principles and rules of his internalized grammar…” but he furthermore “cognizes the principles that underlie the acquisition of language in the first place, the principles of universal grammar….” Thus “cognizing” is extended to include following implicit rules of for example both learned grammar and logical implications. In the latter cases we can make present through reflection what we learned before in experience. But the constraints of universal grammar cannot be made present in the same way. Chomsky is not saying that there are inborn or a priori constraints on ideas, concepts or meanings, as if we were born with an array of contents that just need to be stimulated by experiences.

Steven Pinker has picked up on some of these themes in his thesis of the *language instinct*. For him language is a part of our biological inheritance that makes up our brains. In Davidson’s summary Pinker holds there are linguistic universals “wired in”; this amounts to a genetically programmed “mentalese” or internal language that is not learned, and prior to any spoken language. Thus the syntax, that is, the “connectedness of words… reflects the relatedness of ideas in mentalese.” The child knows from the start mentalese and has to learn an empirical mother tongue by being a kind of translator. We do not really think in this empirical mother tongue. Rather “mentalese” is a silent medium of the brain which is clothed with the empirical language. Davidson accepts the Chomskian view that an empirical language has constraints on syntax – which may, perhaps, exercise structural constraints on semantics, but this does not endow us with concepts. “Nature decided what concepts would come naturally, of course, but this is not to say the mind knew in advance what nature would be like.”

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24) I take these cases of evidence from Davidson, *Truth, Language, and History*, 133–134.
27) Ibid., 134.
6. Transcendental Instinct and the Primal I

Here we may relate Husserl’s theory of instincts to both “generative phenomenology” and “generative grammar.” In the light of the inability of phenomenology to give a first-person account of the matter in question, that is, beginnings its constitution and/or one’s coming to be an agent of manifestation and a speaker, one must speculate and/or reconstruct on the basis of analogies with the transcendental life that we know. “Reconstruction” has to do with the specific “limit-problems”. It is the means of supplementary reflection on what the transcendental phenomenologist has reason to think about but cannot do so on the basis of one’s own actual first-person experience. For example, we must reconstruct what it is like to learn a language, be an infant, have dementia, be asleep, be an animal, bird, insect and so forth. Of special importance for generative phenomenology is the theme of a universal monadology where there is the limit-question of being a beneficiary of a genetic inheritance which provides us with “instincts, many of which aim at the preservation of the species or of this individual as a member of this species.”

Because Husserl in certain contexts uses the terms “instinct” and “will” in very broad senses (as “striving” and “inclination”) he is able to describe his position as a “universal voluntarism.” Essential here is Husserl’s non-reconstructed position that is fundamental for all limit-problems and reconstructions, that is, that transcendental subjectivity is an “I” constituted by two moments: a) my primal I as functioning in its affections and agency, and thereby with all the essential formations achieved by these; b) my primal having or not-I as the primal stream of temporalization and as proto-form of temporalization, wherein there is constituted a primal-being-ness (Sachlichkeit) as the form of temporalization. But these two are not separable entities or components but rather are inseparable distinguishable moments, primal co-equal foundations of the manifestation of all that is manifest.

Being a transcendental I is not living in time but in the presence of primal temporalizing. The I, in its most original sense (ursprünglichste Ursprünglichkeit) is itself not in time, not part of the flow, yet always present dabei, finding there the necessary condition of its determinable life-field and allures of its life. Thus, “I live in my streaming life, I am….but I am not this streaming life itself.” The transcendental I thus remains transcendent to its life and its acquired habitualities; this of course includes language. But this I-moment is a richly laden pole; as the constitutive beginning it is “not an empty I-pole” but rather the I is intellectual “wakeful consciousness” while being “affected” by the primal streaming as well as wakefully attending to and potentially being drawn to it. This initial moment of wakefully being-drawn is its first level of ineluctable instinctual objectifying and Seinsinteresse (for this, see below). “The I in its primal beginning, its primal birth,” which knows no beginning or “first streaming,” is already pervaded by “instinct,” is already a center of intellectual and volitional powers, directed, from the start, to the world. It itself, as pole and center, is intellectual light (see below).

31) Ibid., 197.
32) Ibid., 33.
33) For this collage, see: Edmund Husserl, Die Lebenswelt Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution, Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–1937), Husserliana XXXIX (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 471–472, 477; Husserl, Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution 1929–1934), 257ff. See the fine pages by the Rochus Sowa’s Editor’s Introduction to Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie, xlv–lviii where the general rubric is transcendental-phenomenological “limit-problems.”
It is also *intellectus ipse*, the source by which the *Logos* of Being comes to light through the mind’s encounter with intelligibility in its informing the primal field.4 The transcendental primal I, as intellect itself, as center, pole, source of the life of manifestation of being, is thus not distinct from this power of manifestation. The world is an identity synthesis of endless identity syntheses pervaded by achievements of the couples of presence and absence, rest and motion, sameness and difference. “World,” as the issue of lower order affects founding higher-order acts and judgments and evaluations heading for truth, has its initial propulsion through the power and orientation of the instinctual Logos informing its hyletic flow and pre-forming the logos of the world.

In this way we can distinguish instincts as kinds of “drive-intentionalities” regarding our human life in the world wherein remote hidden goals are pre-reflectively in play which may give rise to a chain effect of partial drives aiming at the long-term ones serving the preservation of the various forms of intentionality. Instincts resemble empty intentions insofar as there is a relationship of nisus toward the fulfillment. But the nisus toward, for example, seeing the lion truly in the school hallway, after hearing the surprising report, “there is a lion in the hall,” is different from the *instinctual* empty intention. In the properly instinctual nisus we do not have a presencing or representation of what is perceptually absent but reported on, nor is there a representation of what was once present in a perception. Rather in instinct we have initially a privation of any familiarity with that toward which there is the nisus. There is a big difference between the filling of an empty intention of what was intended first in an empty way, like a report or hypothesis, and the discovery of an empty instinctive inkling.35

A difference between a mundane instinct and a transcendental instinct, with which the primal I-pole is laden and which empowers the primal I, is the infinity of what Kant calls the regulative idea which is constitutive of the transcendental primal I. Husserl posits (deduces? reconstructs?) a transcendental instinct toward true being, an instinct of objectivity and a transcendental Ideal of adequate presencing of all true being. This, as the foundation of all axiology, pervades and unifies the various levels and kinds of agency, that is, passive, active, kinaesthetic, conative, emotional, intellectual and so forth. Transcendental instincts which have to do with the transcendental genesis of the constituted world are all centered in the I as a center of tendencies, powers, capacity and possibility.

Here we have to do with a primal sense of will constituting the teleological feature of the primal I’s passive association and temporality and the elemental tendencies like apperceiving. Each intentional act emerges within a horizon of Being as a horizon of “interests.” All individual passive and active acts are linked together in the unity of the striving life; each act is part of a chain of universal intentionality which find its center in the primal I. Within the various forms of the I’s striving, active and passive, positing and negating, affirming and negating, the I is conscious by experiencing (erlebend) its agency and passivities, but it is consciously directed to that of which it is conscious (bewusst) through the transparent medium of consciousness.36

7. The Clarification of Being through Logos as the Entelechy of the Primal I

The “transcendental instinct” points to a motivation similar to the hypothesis of a “language instinct.” Both essentially facilitate communication and this is inseparably bound up with their power to clarify and disclose the world. The transcendental instinct is co-original with the regulative idea and both are expressed in an original

Seinsinteresse, “interest in Being,” an originating curiosity that eventually takes the basic forms of an original attraction or repulsion (in which latter case the original interest in Being is disturbed or hindered). The instincts rooted in embodied human being in the world with others for example that of hunger, have an interplay of empty/filled. Eventually through learning there is the task of recognition, identifying, and distinguishing. But prior to an already constituted world there is already the original interest in Being which founds and is informed by the conceptual, linguistic, syntactic clarification of the world. The process of manifestation as an unfolding Seinsinteresse has a foundational form in a primal instinct of objectively manifesting. (Of course, the original “interest in being” as a propulsion toward objectivity might well be lamed until there is the fulfillment of basic elemental drives for example that of hunger. In which case stilling hunger may well be a founding condition for the flourishing of the Seinsinteresse and the enjoyment of other values of a higher order.)

The unity of the process of filling the many-layered and temporally extended intentions (where original intentions of lengthy duration for example self-identifying vocational decisions, may create subordinate ones) reveals itself to have a telos which is not fulfilled in a single achievement but an ongoing unifying one.\(^37\) As we earlier noted, Husserl speaks of an instinct of objectifying or rendering objective.\(^38\) Consider how the stimulus awakens an allure to an apperception. Seeing the vague distant figure is transformed to someone coming; and this one coming is seen as perhaps Peter, but I will not know until he draws closer when I can see more clearly, and then be in a position of establishing the truth, that indeed it seems to be Peter himself who is coming; but then the question might surface why Peter is here when I recall he said earlier he was going elsewhere, and the filled intention occasions a horizon of new empty ones and so forth. The field of perception is not static but dynamic: objects come and go as the same or as changed, they are in rest and motion, near and far, seen by myself and apperceived perceivings of others, in a harmony and dissonance with the perceptions and interests of others and so forth.\(^39\)

Important here is that thinking of the burgeoning forms of consciousness in terms of a “wakeful interest in Being,” we may seem to be accounting for “consciousness” but, of course we are presupposing it all along with terms like allure, interest, curiosity, affection and so forth. In which case self-awareness is prior to the Anstoss of the primal hyle. Husserl seems sometimes to hold that “self-consciousness” is a form of pre-reflective, proto-intentional, awareness of time where the affectings of proto-temporalizations founding the world’s hyle are coincident with an incipient wakeful “intentionality” or “turning-towards.” In which case self-awareness appears to consist in being-affected and a noticing or incipient intentionality.

But this position is difficult to maintain in the light of Husserl’s other claims, such as the essential non-temporality of the primal I.\(^40\) Furthermore, there are good reasons for thinking that the primal I is non-intentionally (and not precisely pre-reflectively, but non-reflectively) self-aware even if it is always also an awareness of its being temporally affected. This latter would not be constitutive of the self-awareness but rather find its condition of being manifest in the prior, egoic non-intentional being-conscious rather than being conscious of… In which case, the I’s self-consciousness would be conceivably trans- and non-temporal, a manifestness in itself, apart from its lived (erlebtes) awareness of itself in its agency and passivities – even though we have no access to such a state of affairs. The I’s agencies and passivities as, first of all, forms of consciousness-


\(^38\) Thereby he draws near to a basic theme in the writings of the distinguished Neo-Kantians, Richard Hönigswald and Wolfgang Cramer.


of... (of which the agent of manifestation is pre-linguistically, pre-reflectively conscious) manifest the world and the presentations of the world, but these presuppose the manifestness and the luminousness of the hyletic field, the elemental illuminated world, the luminousness inseparable from the original interest in being. They presuppose the primal I as the transparent medium which goes in advance of its life as a passive and active agent of manifestation. We will return to this thesis at the end of this essay.

Chomsky and Pinker are right to highlight the tacit non-thematic pre-reflective rule-driven, proto-rationality and proto-linguistic nature of the mind’s elemental vitality to realize the intelligibility of being by way of a Seinsinteresse. We cannot here address the propriety of speaking of this as generative and universal grammar. But we can note that this Chomskyan view has considerable symmetry with Husserl’s own “reconstruction.” Husserl finds a lawfulness, even a proto-linguistic, pre-conceptual “grammar” in the passive synthetic formation of the hyletic temporal field. This provides the I with its horizon of interests and power.

In an important text he wrote of how the primal hyle, both that of the primal temporalizings as well as what these support, that is, the primal hyle or sensa of the world’s deliverances, is suffused with kinaestheses, feelings and instincts. That is, pervading this primal material, which comprises the deliverances of our most elemental sensory involvement with the world, there unfolds a form of unity with its own essential form which is antecedent to the constituted world. Therein is predelineated for the agent of manifestation, always already “instinctively,” the constitution of the entire world. That is, the passive-synthetic functions manifestly bear this essential predelineation. How? Surely we can say in part they display the interplay of Sokolowski’s “couples” of presence/absence, rest/motion, and sameness/difference. But also for Husserl, in this ongoing passive functioning (and interplay of the “couples”) the world’s essential ABC’s (Wesens ABC), the elements of its essential grammar (Wesensgrammatik), are at work in advance and are the foundation for the act-life of reason. Therefore in the transcendental I, as a coincidence of fact and essence there is to be found in advance a teleology of the Logos of being. For Husserl, a full ontology is teleology (and theology); but this itself presupposes the fact of the transcendental I. This fact of “I am,” the “metafact” of the manifestness and self-luminousness which I am, is apodictic; similarly my Seinsinteresse (world-belief and involvement) is an apodictic fact. The primal I is self-manifest, but also transcendentally manifest are one’s worldliness and its teleology.

Other texts, to which we already called attention, and which supplement this one, conceive the transcendental I as being endowed with a power of understanding and reason. Husserl names this intellectus ipse. The knowledge of this a priori does not derive from experience, but rather is the quintessence, Inbegriff, of pure a priori essential possibilities that are implicit in the apperceptive “I-can” framing of all sense-givens. Again, the primal I is not to be envisaged as merely an “empty I-pole” but laden with power and tendencies. Husserl distinguishes between reason’s passivities and its free spontaneous activities, that is, the I-subject as agent of manifestation (intellectus agens). There is symmetry here to what we earlier discussed as the hyletic temporal moment and the egoic-moment. But when we attend to the I-life as one of constant affection and as a consequence of this, the I’s coming into play in its free agency, foremost of rational clarification, we may distinguish a lower level of passivity and a higher level. The former deals with what Husserl calls the elemental grammar and ABC’s, that is, identity syntheses even as these are also forms of “association” and “reproduction.” The higher level of passivity and activity has to do with “the thinking person,” that is, with one’s taking account of the apperceptive framing display of the manifold forms/essences through categorial intuitions (takings as...), synthetic formations, syntactic achievements of states of affairs, the possible compounding formations of

42) Husserl, Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie, Nr. 12 and 19.
whole-part relations and so forth. Perhaps we can say the lower level is a proto-linguistically rational level in the form of pre-linguisticality; the higher level would be both proto-linguistically rational realizing itself both pre-linguistically and linguistically.

Through it all there is the pervasive functioning of the Idea of Truth as founding not only the imperative of objectivity but also the person’s proper moral pursuit of personal integrity in the light of the ideals, that is, in terms of the higher-order overriding obligations and, most importantly, the “absolute ought,” that becomes manifest in the face of the orders of values and duties.43 The Idea of Truth, where we reach perhaps the crowning concept of Husserl’s metaphysics, is an ingredient of the trans-reality which is at once unum bonum verum. As absolute Logos it is the “divine entelechy.” As entelechy it is constitutive of the primal I as intellectus ipse and is the regulative ideal of the system of passive and active powers of the I. 44 This indwelling ineluctable entelechial cause and agency founds inseparably the transcendental I’s capacity to bring to light the truth of all possible objects and possible truths regarding all objects. Herein lies the transcendental foundation of language as both an active and passive power of reason.

8. The Question of Language as a Medium of Knowing

The proposal that language is a “medium” of being or reality may draw an initial assent. But the nature of the medium’s mediation is one of the basic questions for philosophy. As we noted earlier, the life of consciousness as an agency of manifestation means that being “comes to light” through the manifesting. Consciousness’ agency of manifestation is the medium of the being of the world. (It is because of the transparency and obviousness of this agency that Husserl introduced the unique disengagement and shift that we know as the “transcendental reduction.”) Earlier we gave indications of how the life of consciousness’ rational manifestation of the world is bound up with language. Linguistic achievements are typically in the service of mind as the agency of manifestation for example in the service of one’s wanting to say, clarify, distinguish, reveal and so forth. Both the pre- or non-linguistic acts of display (e.g., perceptions or rememberings) as well as for example statements facilitating communing as well as in the service of “I mean to say,” are a self-effacing, relatively “invisible” medium. We see, read, hear, and touch (especially as in Braille) what is signified without explicitly attending to the signifier, the printed or spoken or felt word, even though the pitch, choice of words, the accents, font, syntax, place of modifiers and so forth, themselves can be major determinants in what we see, hear, or read.

The spoken, written, and read words are able to be focused on only by way of abstraction or disengagement from what is signified by them. When we do this we are able to appreciate the “riddle or puzzle of expression,” that is, how certain contingent present, particular, actual events in the world, that is, sensible sounds and sights and touches can be vehicles for what is essentially absent, ideal, universal, necessary, eternal and so forth. This essential difference between carrier of meaning and the meaning already indicates how language, at least in its sensible manifestation, is a vehicle for mind or rational consciousness.

In these final sections we want to return to the question of whether there is not a sense in which language presupposes consciousness in a more fundamental way than consciousness presupposes language. We have already partly addressed this issue at various junctures, for example, in the pre-linguistic achievements of identity syntheses

in the constitution of phonemes as building blocks. Another consideration is the (language-informed) pre-linguistic realm of *das dunkle Etwas* or “felt-meaning” of the empty intention of meaning-to-say which is antecedent to the achievement of sentences. Of course this realm is thoroughly informed by the habitus of the language, comparable to the way the learned skills of riding a bike or playing the piano are at work in these activities.

“Wanting/meaning to say” is pre-linguistic in the same sense that the horizon of meaning is implicit (pre-objective, pre-thematic, etc.). The horizontally given is transcendent to the agency of manifestation, yet it is immanently informing and the necessary condition for the explicit acts of perceiving. Similarly the meaning-to-say aims at the “transcendent” proposition beyond itself but is informed by it as well as by its habitus of the language, the necessary lived condition of the speaker for achieving the sentence as the expression of the proposition.

But, as we also indicated, this habitus of language and its horizon of true statements have their transcendental a priori in the transcendental instinct of the primal I’s being *intellectus ipse*, that is, by mind’s being informed by the transcendental idea of truth which opens it to its ultimate horizon. This entelechy constitutive of the primal I is essential to what we mean for a person to be conscious. Here is a sense in which the agency of manifestation is mediated, that is, informed, by constitutive formal considerations of reason and language in the service of reason.

Focusing on the precise sense of the speculative metaphor of “language as a medium” can advance our discussion. With the help of Donald Davidson we may ask whether language may be said to be a transparent medium? One might be positivistically inclined and say nouns, names, and predicates refer to things that we “see,” in accord with the way we might be tempted to say we “see” sense data, and thereby hold for a primitive isomorphism between “world” and the flow of “impressions.” Such a crude proposal has difficulty in clarifying how we know reported states of affairs or facts, that is, that something is true, apart from rendering “it,” for example, the (linguistic) report of a lion’s-being-in-the-school-hallway, except through sentences expressing propositions and confirming this in a perception informed by this empty intention. How is the report of facts or states of affairs given and confirmed apart from language, for example, by mere sensa? How is there non-linguistically given and confirmed the report of the basketball referee that the free-throw shooter’s shot is invalid by reason of his foot’s being on the foul line while shooting the free throw?

Language is not an isomorphic substitute for sense data or perceptual experience. Sense data may be thought of as what are appearing aspects of or even founding perceptual apperceptions, that is, of what we “see”. In this sense appearances are ingredients or aspects of what appears, not proxies or representations. A perception is not achieved through mere sensa or aspects without the presence of that of which they are aspects which itself is an achievement of proto-syntax, for example, a seeing-as; it becomes true perceiving when the truth of the aspect, profile, or property ascription is brought to light; for example, that brownish moving blur in the hall was a Dalmatian not a lion.

Apart from difficulties of the positivist predispositions, the more general problem is how linguistic utterances represent or show reality – or anything else – without being able to show the entities specified apart from the linguistic reality, which apartness would put us in a position of being able to state/show whether there was a transparent showing. For Husserl the filled intention of seeing what was proposed for our belief just as it was proposed is itself a matter of “intuitive evidence,” mediated by the linguistic event of a sentence embodying the proposed proposition. True propositions are rendered in filled intentions (seeing for oneself with one’s own eyes: “There is indeed a lion in the hallway!”) of what is presented to us first linguistically in an empty intention.

The failure of the positivist theory of an isomorphic fit of language and sensa as a transparent medium may well lead us to a basic skepticism of the adequacy of language for knowing. Similarly it may encourage

the skeptical cultural relativist version of language games and thereby promoting the view that there are radically different incommensurable languages and universes of discourse, which is different than acknowledging heterogeneous universes of discourse within the encompassing one true world. But in response we can ask how such incommensurability could be demonstrated, how we could know this claim of incommensurability to be the case, seems to be unaddressed in such proposals. (Would we know that these “others” were speakers? That a language was in play. That what we are hearing were declarative sentences with truth claims? Et cetera.) With Davidson we can grant that there are languages that we do not understand and do not have access to, for example, the relativistic scheme of quantum physics; but even that requires that we acknowledge the fundamental “universal scheme” or even grammar with its quasi-Aristotelian ontology of macroscopic objects with properties, and where the “is” of predication is an evident tie or linking of a property to a subject, that is, where there is an assertion, a declaration of truth. (And, as was noted by us earlier, this judgment implies that this truth fits within the universe of true being.)

Such considerations move Davidson to say: “We do not see the world through language any more than we see the world through our eyes. We do not look through our eyes, but with them.” I take this distinction to mean two things: we do not have a medium which intervenes, whether transparently, translucently, or opaquely; and what we mean by “seeing” is knowing with (not through) our organs of perceptions. Living as living with one another linguistically in the world involves being perceivers seeking to know reality truly as we meet it in the course (and intercourse) of our embodied living.

Beyond this, Davidson wants, nevertheless, to retain a non-metaphorical sense to “seeing through language” in so far as language itself may be thought of as analogously an organ of perception, like eyes and ears, by which we cope with our environment. As none of our organs of perception are intermediaries, media, or windows, so neither is language. The merit of Davidson’s replacing “medium” with “organ,” and thus seeing-through-a-medium with seeing-with-an-organ is diminished for those burdened with failing eye sight and hearing. But it is useful for indicating that what we want to know and articulate through language, as well as with our organs, is in the service of rational conscious manifestation of the world. What I want to say or get clear on is mediated by necessary means and these are typically invisible in proportion to their serviceability. Of course, sometimes “words fail” and this has an analogy with hearing by way of a failing left ear.

Donaldson believes we tend to think that language is radically different from the senses partly because there is no external organ devoted just to it. Furthermore, it is clear that there is a diversity of languages, whereas everyone has the same sense organs. Nevertheless, there is supporting evidence for speech being an analogous organ because it has a specialized location in the brain, that is, language is in this respect as much a human biological organ as eyes for seeing. Further, as Davidson notes, Chomsky and Pinker have made plausible the theory of a basic universality of languages by way of showing universal grammatical constraints on all actual languages. This may encourage the belief in a common deep grammar. But Davidson is correct in his reluctance to take these considerations to imply necessarily that there is a kind of “inner language” prior to and/or independent of the languages one learns by living in a family. The evidence for this aspect of a language instinct which results in “a mental organ” or an innate internal universal language, or “mentalese” is weak. Nevertheless there is a non-metaphorical sense of conceiving language as a medium of knowing analogous to the way we may take healthy organs of sense-perceptions to be that with which, not through which, we perceive – and which stand in contrast to ailing and aging organs of perception.

46) Ibid., 130–131.
47) Ibid., 133.
9. Conclusion: Is the Luminousness of Egoic Consciousness the Most Basic Medium?

For our conclusion we want to sketch a sense of medium of the articulation of being which is more basic than language and more basic than the shift from “seeing or knowing through” to a “seeing or knowing with” (an analogous mental or brain organ). It is more basic than the various kinds of pre-linguistic manifestation, some of which we have discussed. It is more basic because it has to do with what is most basic to any form of knowing as true display or manifestation of being. We have already noted that “manifestation as manifesting” is invisible. And if there is to be true knowing the agency of manifestation itself may not be a medium in the unsatisfactory or pejorative senses Davidson assigns to it, for example, possibly translucent or opaque. A perfectly “transparent” medium would seem to be unobjectionable even if the “agency” of its being such were able to become, at least in part, manifest. But if this medium and agency were transparent to the point of being unconscious and absolutely unknowable it would not be an intellectual manifestation. If there were no responsible self-aware agent of manifestation there would be no first-personal (nominative) agent and dative of manifestation. Intellectual manifestation is properly a responsible agency of truthful manifestation. It does not happen apart from personal human agents. Robots/computers are instruments of the agents of manifestation; their work is meaningful, truthful, and valuable only as designed, used, and interpreted by human agents of manifestation. Thus the issue of consciousness is essential.

In what follows we merely assert theses that support the position that the primal I is the luminous medium more basic than language and more basic than even the act-life of the agency of manifestation. It is not a medium as something one sees or knows-through but which can be a thematized something, an *id quod*; rather it is the luminous clearing, by which and from which (*id et ex quo*) what is manifest is manifested. The most basic undemonstrated claim here is that the primal I’s intellectual light as the agency of manifestation is not a metaphor whereas all other manifesting lights are. And in as much as the primal I is inseparable from light, truth, and being, these too may lay claim to being inseparably the essential, necessary features of the most fundamental and luminous medium.

Egoic consciousness, *Bewusst-sein*, is always a non-reflective being-known, being-present or “for itself,” wherein it is therefore not a case of *cogito ergo sum*, but *sum ergo cogito*. Thus there is a coincidence of “being and being-for-itself through a self-manifesting (*Selbsterscheinen*), an absolute manifesting wherein the manifested necessarily is. And this primal mode of manifesting is prior to all self-reflection, and thus is a manifesting of a particular contour.”

Thus consciousness, being non-intentionally self-present, that is, *Bewusst-sein*, is always also by reason of one’s constitution by the idea of truth, consciousness of one’s being within a horizon; *Bewusstsein ist immer Seins-Bewussstsein*. In the agency of manifestation there is a form of non-reflective self-awareness as the basis and presupposition for all intentional-reflective forms of the agency of manifestation toward which one is ineluctably impelled by the insertion in the streaming hyletic field and the call to be a truthful agent of manifestation.

Furthermore, in spite of the imperative of disinterestedness and objectivity one must say that “a truly anonymous knowing (*Wissen*) is inconceivable,” and the objectivity, detachment and distance-taking “of the one inquiring from the inquiry is, after all, created in and by the knowing subject himself (*Erkennende*), with the effect that even in it he is still aware of himself.”

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49) Dieter Henrich, *Endlichkeit und Sammlung des Lebens* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 20. “Created in and by...” would have to be an accommodation to the entelechy of the transcendental Idea of Truth. We neglect here the case for possible egoless forms of consciousness made for example by Jean-Paul Sartre, Hector-Neri Castañeda, Dieter Henrich, and Manfred Frank; we neglect also
Because of such considerations, I believe a strong case can be made that the primal I is the unique agency of manifestation that serves as the luminous medium for all manifestations.\(^{50}\) This “light,” most basically the apodictic luminosity of self-awareness as an awareness of the being of oneself is, at the same time, because of one’s constitution by the “divine entelechy,” a pre-grasp of being and the truth of being as emergent always out of the world as founded in the temporal hyletic field. The primal I is thus the necessary condition for both the visibility of the perceivable world as well as the manifestness of being’s formal intelligibility. As the visibility of nature remains utterly concealed in the absence of consciousness, no matter how bright the light of illuminating bodies; as the luminous intelligibility of formal and ideal objects and states of affairs is similarly mute and non-evident in the absence of intellectual consciousness; so is the stunning brilliance of nature’s rich mathematical language and intelligibility silent and invisible in the absence of egoic agency of manifestation, for example, by scientists. As Conrad-Martius put it, “light must meet light in order for there to be light.”\(^{51}\)

Because language is in the service of intellectual consciousness undergoing the lure of the teleology of presencing, for example, in wanting-to-say through the lure of the “dark something” or felt-meaning, or in noticing and articulating that aspect of the field of perception luring to attention, there is always presupposed both the manifestness of non-reflective self-consciousness as well as the hyletic and determinable field of awareness, which the clearing of egoic intellectual consciousness establishes. This, we propose, is most fundamentally the non-reflective self-awareness aware of itself and its power to know, that is, the egoic luminousness of the primal I. This is the founding “light” which is not a being, not in time or space, utterly (non-reflectively, non-intentionally) transparent, and, in this sense the “From Which” (Von), Arché, Logos, and Quelle of all that appears to consciousness.\(^{52}\) Not only is it the source as the necessary condition for all determinateness that its agency of manifestation brings to light, but it is also the source of the determinability luring to proper determination. Thus it is the source of the “appearing” which is a noticing verging on a “turning-towards,” which itself is an implicit primitive pre-predicative grasping (Seinsinteresse). This, in turn, provides the substrate for the more explicit syntactical explication. That is, there is an original manifest being-ness of the unified being out of the luminous horizon of being, an emergent Sachverhalt, for example, the being-diseased of the arm, which serves as the basis for the predicative division and its eventual explicit synthesis in a true judgment. Of course, language surfaces already at the pre-predicative level of emergent categoriality and syntax. But its “mediality” as an organ of articulation presupposes the “self-manifestness” of the child developing into mature rational articulateness, as well as that of the adult speaker or writer within the field illuminated by the primal I. Indeed, everything appears within the unified illuminated field of a concordant experiencing, “without which nothing would be there for me. It is given in a medium which is not one of Nature, but rather one which is purely egoic (ichlich).”\(^{53}\)


\(^{52}\) This thesis is to be found in Husserl’s *Ideen I* (1913), but here I use the formulations in Edmund Husserl, *Transzendentaler Idealismus: Texte aus dem Nachlass* (1908–1921), Husserliana XXXXXVI, ed. Robin D. Rollinger and Rochus Sowa (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 68–72, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1062-7.

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