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Lucio Angelo Privitello
Philosophy and Religion Program
Stockton University, New Jersey
<http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5875-6068>

The Devil Wears Damask: Twilled Teaching as Apprenticeships in Creativity

Abstract:

My guiding *quest*-ion is how to convey, speak of, and prepare apprenticeships in creativity. This study emerges from experiences and reflections on the vocation of teaching courses in philosophy, and from having lived through an apprenticeship in my formative years. In an apprenticeship, one draws upon one's own *horizon of entrance*, to inhabit an embrasure. The space of an embrasure delimits the problem of form, while the formed and delimited aperture allows space to be displaced and reconstructed. Such is how *muthos*, *istoria*, and *logos* become differing potential of their own presence persisting again as the difference that poses itself as foreign. Such is the beauty of pedagogical discourse that is never foreign to both sides of an embrasure.

Keywords:

apprenticeships in creativity, horizon of entrance, embrasure, pedagogy, Pierre Hadot, Juliusz Domański, Roland Barthes

The desire for truth is confronted with poems, with tales written by you long ago. And then you are ashamed, because it was all sheer myth. Neither did any of it happen, nor did you feel the feeling contained therein. The language itself unfurled its velvet yarn in order to cover what, without it, would equal nothing.

– Czesław Miłosz, “The Language”

Introduction

This study is indebted to a generous invitation to present at the symposium, “Philosophy of Culture: Field, Method, Theory, or Way of Life?” chapter 2 of the International Philosophy of Culture Week, June 8–11.¹ The impetus of my study emerged from experiences and reflections on the vocation of teaching courses in philosophy. I realize how such an angle shares in a dialogue with the philosophy of culture or, more precisely, enculturation, seeing that as participants, each of us were product of, and now, for the most part, function within pedagogical arenas. Some of our orbits are tighter, some at a distance, some have become satellites, and others even comets. Yet, the attractor remains, whether as institution, edging outside an institution, or as reverence for the vocation, history, or the shared joy of the impossible or beloved community. Here is where field, method, theory, and (hopefully not “or”) way of life are always already twilled. Each of these aspects are of themselves constantly in a wandering mode, closer or further from our grasp. Their place and their meanings shift as we engage them critically. In what follows, I could not attempt to tackle the vast interrelations of pedagogical theory, methods of teaching philosophy, or the elusive, yet haunting idea of “field.” I can only hope that some form and way of life may emerge from experiencing, and sharing, these dimensions as modes of enculturation.

Horizon of Entrance

My guiding *quest-ion* is how to convey and prepare apprenticeships in creativity. An apprenticeship in creativity is about working with excess, need, and at times, losses found in a classroom. Such an apprenticeship is to have students realize their *horizon of entrance*, shifting from comfortable institutional questions, or no *quest-ions* at all, to the lure and discomfort of living a *quest-ion*, as “lived thought” (*Gelebtes denken*).² A key to this apprenticeship is to draw upon one’s own *horizon of entrance*, laying it out in texts and figures that are under study, as a combination of historiography and epistemology. Embrasures here begin to build. We all enjoy a good story (*muthos*). I set my *horizon of entrance* in telling students about my story (*muthos*) and journey in learning-to-know, and then couple it more closely to the readings as *istoria* (accounts of my inquiry, or history), as a knowing-learned. Finally, when and if the muses strike, I arrive at a *logos*, or what I call a learned-knowing, or more patterned account. This structures the *horizon of entrance*, as I have experienced it as teaching/sharing in the meaning arena, and it brings me back to Aristotle’s statement that “a lover of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom, for myth is composed of wonders.”³ We need to ignite this “in a sense ... lover” with stories. In an apprenticeship, this is required from the teacher that in turn inspires students/apprentices.⁴

1) My conference presentation was entitled, “Twilled Teaching and Pedagogical Prophet-ear-rings,” here retooled to reflect what, I believe, is more illustrative of this on-going study.

2) “Lived thought” is Lukács’ term used in his autobiography. I would add that a lived thought is equivalent to a reflective account in ways of living, a style or patterning that represents what one has *x-tended* into a future. Hadot and Domański are guides in the tensions between university philosophy and a more vital art of living in dialogue from ways of life. See Pierre Hadot, *What is Ancient Philosophy?* trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 261–270, and Juliusz Domański, *La Philosophie, Théorie ou manière de vivre? Les controverses de l’Antiquité à la Renaissance* (Fribourg: Suisse: Editions Universitaire Fribourg Suisse, 1996), 20–21, 55–58.

3) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book 1, Part 2, 982b18, trans. by W.D. Ross. My translation differs, and reads, “even the untrained or unknowing wonder, believing their love of legends is love of wisdom, for these are also composed of wonders.”

4) I leave snippets of my story here as a footnote, and quite condensed, but told (as I tell it to my students), in support of this *horizon of entrance*. My journey was, and still is, somewhat of a wandering, not only geographically speaking, but culturally, pedagogically, and emotionally speaking. Being raised and coming of age in Sicily (though born in the heart of Manhattan), I began to exercise my love of culture in the visual arts, and with a degree in ceramics and design from an art institute. Before that, music was what I was fed, even before

Patiently, perhaps unbeknownst, one inevitably wears what one has worked on when time is given over to shared spaces and lived-experiences. Then a pattern evolves, perfecting the lines that extend it into new canvases, landscapes, and meeting spaces. It is then that an apprenticeship either becomes a person's craft, *ethos anthropo daimon* (ἦθος ἀνθρώπου δαίμων),⁵ or becomes love, that Proust would say, "is space and time made perceptible to the heart."⁶ Such are how wonders are composed and shared.

As in relational spaces, when twisted together, one finds oneself exactly where one has been preparing the richest of yarns.⁷ I speak from this yarn as a further *effect* of a history (*istoria*), from a life lived as a patterning

I could chew, and with it a humanistic culture, as well as mandatory attendance in concert halls, and cultural gatherings throughout Italy, and the States. While an art student in Sicily, I became an apprentice to a master painter and sculptor in Parma, Italy. My use of "apprenticeship in creativity" was born and nurtured from this unique experience, and Parma remains the city of my heart. That lasted five years, along with my normal art schoolwork, and its culmination in the Italian (High school) State Exam. Students then ask, but how did Philosophy get into the picture? There too, as Tyche would have it, and in Sicily, I was introduced to the history of philosophy proper by a family friend, and a Philosophy Professor at the Liceo Cutelli of Catania. He was a university mate, and life-long friend of my father (*un vero fratello*). Back in the late 30s and 40s, both attended university in Pisa, Piacenza, and my father completed his work at the Music Conservatory in Parma. I was first given Plato's *Republic*, Book VII, and Plato's *Gorgias*, upon the slopes of Mount Etna, and there began a dialogue with "Zio Gino" that also lasted for nearly half a decade, until his premature death. From those early days, art-making, art history, philosophy, literature, and my plans for a degree in architecture/urban design captured what I saw as a total involvement in creative and social endeavors. Tyche had other plans, and my well set plan to enter the Department of Architecture/Urban Design at the University of Florence was disrupted ... I was drafted, in fact ... and I then decided to return to the States, being accepted at the Rhode Island School of Design. I found architecture at RISD not political enough, and so I shifted into Illustration (that was too commercial), and then finally into Sculpture, receiving a BFA. My students then ask, why Philosophy, again? At RISD, I was fortunate to have had two Professors, A.A. Anderson and Mihai Nadin, who both gave fantastic classes in Philosophy, and I took every one I could. Due to being re-inspired, I ended up at the Philosophy Department at Temple University for my M.A. Eliminating gory and gorgeous details, though I do share them with my students as ways of and in life, I then founded a *bona fide* Contracting Company. This sends them through the roof, incredulous, yet intrigued. I then built my own art studio, began painting again, and running fancy-free in art supplies stores, not being such the starving artist. Travels back to Europe, work, and much else happened (and students love those parts), and I then began to teach classes in Philosophy as an Adjunct instructor ... and ten years went by travelling between schools, and two states. A true sophist and Sicilian, at that. Encouraged by faculty members at various schools throughout my adjuncting career, I decided to apply again to Graduate School in Philosophy (earn a Ph.D.), and was fortunate to find myself accepted at Villanova University. There I went through a grand experience, and it brought me to where I am now (with many events, wanderings, and details held back), give or take seventeen years or so. My students love tales of the in-betweens, the life turns and twists, that I generously provide at opportune moments (*karios* indeed). The telling of those practices of everyday life help weave a canvas upon which they can see how one's designs (or how inherited set-designs) become drawn upon a love of enculturation. Here too *Kairos* never travels without *Metanoia*, and I adore their company so that my students may also see them as good company in their ways of life.

5) Heraclitus, frag. 247. See also frags. 119 and 112.

6) Marcel Proust, "The Captive," in *Remembrance of Things Past*, vol. 3, trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff, Terence Kilmartin, and Andreas Major (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), 392. On the issue of love, both as sublimated love and as friendship, see Pierre Hadot, *What is Ancient Philosophy?*, 60, 70, 42–44, and Hadot, "Unitary Experience and Philosophical Life," in *The Present Alone Is Our Happiness: Conversations with Jeannie Carlier and Arnold I. Davidson*, trans. Marc Djaballah (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 79. This can be related to Dilthey's "life-experience" (*Lebenserfahrung*), where "each thing or each person receives a particular force and coloring from its relations to my life ... (life-value) ... life already contains the forces operative in the imagination." See "Poetry and Lived Experience," Part II and "Goethe and the Poetic Imagination" (1910), in *Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Works*, ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, vol. 5, *Poetry and Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 237–238. See also "lived experience is not merely something present, but already contains past and future within its consciousness of the present," *ibid.*, 225. Cf. Didier Fassin's worry about *Lebensphilosophie* in Didier Fassin, *Life: A Critical User's Manual* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2018), 10–11.

7) The epigram from Czesław Miłosz may be brought back here, and the cloak of language's "velvet yarn." Such a yarn is required as the budding and life-long confrontation between where the desire for truth (certitude) and poems (or a poetic-artistic expressive existence) is embraced, but without shame. Yes, it begins in the sheerest of myth, enchanted stories, and moments that simply overflow the languaged ability of an apprentice. As such it drops into what seems/seams the fissures of the conditions of possibility between nothing and everything. In this sense, language is, as Cassirer explained, "*not merely an externalization of ourselves ... it is a pathway to (realization of) ourselves.*" See Ernst Cassirer, *The Logic of the Humanities*, trans. Clarence Smith Howe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 113.

from multiple parts and pieces. As Roland Barthes taught us, “‘effectiveness’ implies the idea of work but also the desire to seduce, to communicate, to be loved. A pedagogy of effects is thus possible: students would be made aware of and sensitive to the production and reception of effects.”⁸ I further imagine this as Roman Ingarden’s “concretization,” paired with Domański’s use of the concept of “présentification.”⁹ What we have then is an ontic surplus of what composes not only reception of effects, but also a heritage (formed effects), and, as Domański cites Ingarden, a “régénération des époques passées.”¹⁰ This would be the pedagogy of effects of an apprenticeship in creativity, and an exercise in form-ing. Again with Domański,

Within Ingarden’s act of “concretization,” the subject that carries out the “presentification” does not create the content *ex nihilo*. However, from the other part, the ontic condition of the person “presentified,” and the condition of the work that is intermediary would in fact be completely negative in this subject, without the recipient.¹¹

These *seams*, for such I believe is the nature of time in creative acts and creativity, are prepared and performed from and towards a teaching practice, and yet may find themselves caught in the meta-orders of theory, repetitive outlines, or hovering administrative strategies. Such is the motley muck and mire of the everyday.¹² Nevertheless, such is our realm, and therein we find many treasures.¹³ The problem is how to go about working, shifting, and transforming what appears as subterranean elements, unseen, unheeded, untold, or repressed, into fabrics of the richest damask, into what I call a twilled teaching or apprenticeships in creativity.

On and About the Term “Creativity”

The five previous mentions of the impossible term “creativity” are enough to call for a brief explanation of my usage. In a way, “apprenticeship” would suffice to grasp the day-to-day practice of a twilled teaching, due to how the experience is a living assemblage of a form of life, maintenance of its disciplined pattern, a shared history and learning of techniques, and a lived immersion in the chosen field of the apprenticeship. As an appren-

8) Roland Barthes, “Literature/Teaching” in *The Grain of the Voice: Interviews 1962–1980*, trans. Linda Coverdale (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 240. See also Cassirer’s use of “effected” *Wirken* (doing, effecting) as *Gewirktes* (something woven), in *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, vol. 4, *On the Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms*, trans. John Michael Krois (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 158.

9) See Juliusz Domański, *Le texte come presence: Contribution à l’histoire de la réflexion sur le texts et le livre*, trans. par Beata Spieralska-Kasprczyk (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2017), 190n297 and 193–197, <https://doi.org/10.3726/b11242>.

10) *Ibid.*, 193.

11) *Ibid.*, 196. My own translation. The French version reads: “Dans l’acte ingardenien de ‘concrétisation’ le subject qui effectue la ‘présentification,’ n’en crée pas le contenu *ex nihilo*. D’autre part cependant la condition ontique de la personne ‘présentifiée,’ et la condition de l’oeuvre qui est intermédiaire, seraient tout à fait négatives sans ce sujet, sans le reveur.”

12) On these tensions, traps, and possible treasures, I refer the reader to Eli Kramer’s article, “Philosophical Wandering as a Mode of Philosophy in Cultural Life: From Diogenes of Sinope to Cornel West,” *Eidos. A Journal for the Philosophy of Culture* 2, no.3 (5) (2018): 51–73, <https://doi.org/10.26319/5815>. See especially section one, “Modes of Philosophy,” as a springboard to stress wider vocational training and experiences, more open, creative, risk-taking assignments in teaching, and to designing more beautiful corridors to the grand Philosophy Hotel. On this note I recall Matthew Sharpe’s presentation for the June 10 Symposium, entitled, “Reclaiming Humanism in Light of a Philosophy as a Way of Life.” I agree with his understanding and underlining of philosophy as a total social fact (inspired by Mauss), to shaping *personae*, and his use of Hadot’s daily patterns – *polis* – spiritual exercises in reclaiming a revised humanism and philosophy’s place freed from a herding mentality of division and scholasticism.

13) “The Buddha’s absolute is discovered in the absolute of the banal and immediate real.” Pierre Hadot quoting Pierre Ryckman in *The Present Alone is our Happiness*, 81.

tice, one hopes to master the techniques, both material and conceptual, of the chosen field, as well as embody the way of life of the teacher. Creativity is the ability to compose these factors in a continuous way, seemingly without effort, but that was precisely the undertow of the entire experience of the apprenticeship. I would agree with Władysław Tatarkiewicz, that creativity is a “useful watchword,” and acts like a “banner ... necessary ... at ceremonies and sometimes even in battle.”¹⁴ Thus, creativity coupled with apprenticeship, as in apprenticeships in creativity, is a reflexive move that beckons for the adverb “as.” Apprenticeships are creative endeavors, where creativity is the Ingardenian “concretization” of one long apprenticeship. The “concretization” is actually one of a way of life, not merely of producing a work of art, science, or literature.¹⁵ The latter is nothing but a concretization of the former, and helps heal the split between creative product, and creative process as a life, and between observing and making.

Two contemporary philosophers come to mind to help my vision at this point. One is Michael Krausz, who described what I have experienced many times, and, as he put it, it is when “I suddenly experienced myself *in* the space of the work instead of looking *at* it.”¹⁶ When part of an apprenticeship, and a life pattern, this becomes, as he also well stated, where “we can take up the self and its life as a creative work ... self-transformation per se as a creative product, thus undermining a general and sharp distinction between creative process and creative product.”¹⁷ The other philosopher is John J. McDermott who, in explaining Dewey’s aesthetic pedagogy and the phases of the inchoate, the anaesthetic, the aesthetic, and the consummatory, lends clarity to the experience of an apprenticeship in creativity. I would add, in a condensed fashion, that an apprenticeship in creativity is a training in being tuned to the aesthetic/anaesthetic “rhythm in our personal living,” allowing the wider tuning fork of the inchoate and the consummatory to become our tonal relationship with a life, “that we live ... aware of the symbolic nuance that accompanies all of our experiences.”¹⁸ This could very well be where aesthetics makes up a *horizon of entrance* as a philosophy of enculturation, and culture as a continuous apprenticeship. This is what a teaching experience and performance must perpetually embody, and what adds to a cultured subjectivity and its roots linked in the alterity of culture as the very palette of creativity.¹⁹ What follows are four summary suggestions that work from boundary conditions in an apprenticeship in creativity.²⁰

14) Władysław Tatarkiewicz, *A History of Six Concepts: An Essay in Aesthetics*, trans. Christopher Kasparek (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), 250–251, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8805-7>.

15) I refer the reader once again to Domański, *Le texte come presence*, 190–297 and 193–197, and would add Roman Ingarden, “Artistic and Aesthetic Values” in *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*, ed. Peter McCormick (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1983), 92.

16) Michael Krausz, *Roots in the Air: A Philosophical Autobiography of a Philosopher, Artist, and Musician* (Leiden: Brill Rodopi, 2010), 195.

17) *Ibid.*, 200, 198.

18) John J. McDermott, *The Drama of Possibility: Experience as Philosophy of Culture* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 231, 234, <https://doi.org/10.5422/fso/9780823226627.001.0001>. On a fascinating reading of Dewey, education, the philosophy of culture (and then some), see also Thomas M. Alexander, “Eros and Spirit: Towards a Humanistic Philosophy of Culture,” *The Pluralist* 5, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 18–44, <https://doi.org/10.1353/plu.2010.0006>. I would agree with Alexander on many points, and ones that here assist the experience of apprenticeships in creativity. Some would be, “to understand cultures as ‘spiritual ecologies’” (19); or “When Eros engages culture as education ... it transforms into care ...” (20); on shifting the question to “How are these meanings lived?” against the question “Are these beliefs true?” (21); and “Creativity is a function of disclosure of possibilities capable of development” (34); and how “Cultures are inherited patterns for the possibility of meaning” (37).

19) Of this possibility, I would refer to Aleš Erjavec, “Aesthetics: Philosophy of Art or Philosophy of Culture?” *Filozofski vestnik* 22, no.2, (2000): 7–20.

20) Boundary conditions overcome what Nietzsche believed was “philosophy gradually turning into nothing but professional border patrolling (*Grenzwächterschaft*).” See Friedrich Nietzsche, “Philosophy in Hard Times” in *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s*, ed. and trans. by D. Breazeale (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1979), 112.

Pedagogy of the Nuance

Difficult as it is to shade a cloud (*nuance nuée*), it is relatively simple compared to unraveling the nuances of a theory, a storyline of a course, or a student's singularity. How does one describe or display the *raise* of a nuance? How can the texture of a text be dis-played, caught in its very sheen, so that the split between making and observing, reflecting and creating may be twilled, allowing the fabric of a course to be experienced as a philosophical mode of life?²¹ How does one teach nuances when a course is not yet seen as snapshots of lived-experiences? Only when the intended is continually *x*-tended, only when what tends, and the once tended, is drawn as a mark on a map, a mark yet-to-come of what was and is being unfolded, can the split between making and observing become the effected seams of a living text. I think here of Domański's Petrarca, and the conversation with authors of the past as a prolongation of human life, as a making-present, as dialogue, "conversation," and as a making-real.²² An apprenticeship works in these modes, as a continuation of forms of living, techniques, and stories that simultaneously reach out to a past and a future. Petrarca embodied the writerly techniques of the Latin tradition, learned through imitation in apprenticing, in the research as testimonials of antiquity and in epistolary dialogue, which he molded into a communicative virtue in the vulgate. Fourteenth century Humanism in Italy was a crucible of aspects of apprenticeships in creativity, discovery, cherishing, and conserving of ways of life. These emerged as conversations with authors, as Domański explains and exemplifies through Petrarca, Pier Paolo Vergerio, and Leonardo Bruni Aretino, and to which one should add Coluccio Salutati, Manuele Crisolora, Poggio Bracciolini, and Giorgio Gemisto.²³

These examples and encounters form the richness of damask, as spaces sewn between piece and persons, teacher and students. A course, a classroom, is a weave of lives. These types of encounters are interventions of the process of creativity, reconstructing the steps of the encounter as creativity itself.²⁴ By engaging in the conditions under which discoveries are reported, the practice of pedagogy as art and practice of the nuance turns an individual towards a relationship of the lived encounter. Nietzsche called this "the prose of contact":

For any sort of aesthetic activity of perception to exist, a certain physiological precondition is indispensable: *intoxication*. Intoxication must first have heightened the excitability of the entire machine: no art results before that happens. All kinds of intoxication ... have the power to do this: ... sexual excitement, feasting, contest, of the brave deed, of victory, of extreme agitation, cruelty, destruction,

21) See Hadot, *The Present Alone is our Happiness*, 35–36, 109–112. "The courage to live a philosophy has broken down," Nietzsche, "Philosophy in Hard Times" 107. See also Hadot, "Ancient philosophy proposed to mankind an art of living. By contrast modern philosophy appears above all as the construction of a technical jargon reserved for specialists," in Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, trans. Michael Chase (Laden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1995), 272.

22) See Domański, *Le texte come presence*, 124, 132, 135.

23) See Francesco Flora, *Storia della Letteratura Italiana*, Volume Primo, *Dal Medio Evo alla fine del Quattrocento* (Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori Editori, 1940), 454–457. See also Attilio Momigliano, *Storia della Letteratura Italiana: dalle origini ai nostri giorni* (Messina: Casa Editrice Giuseppe Principato, 1937), 105–115.

24) I believe this has to do with what Bourdieu called the "intelligence of the body," a *savoir-faire* as *savoir-faire*, and the construction of a field, with "stances, and properties of ... readers," that open up "to free analysis from the effects of the position ... that ...one ... occupies in that space." in Pierre Bourdieu, *Manet: A Symbolic Revolution. Lectures at the Collège de France* (1998–2000), trans. Peter Collier and Margaret Rigaud-Drayton (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017), 73, 25–26. See also Ernst Cassirer's view of historical understanding as "Documentation through the products generated" (*Das Zeugnis durch das Gezeugte, Erzeugte*) in *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, vol. 4, *On the Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms* 164, and his view of language as "a pathway to (the realization of) ourselves," in *The Logic of the Humanities*, 113. See also Cassirer's idea of the "polymorphism of human existence" that enriches the self in *An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), 191.

the intoxication of spring ... finally the intoxication of the will ... of an overloaded and distended will.
From out of this feeling one gives to things, one *compels* them to take a procedure ... *idealizing*.²⁵

Only by setting up these engaging conditions for the possibility of a “prose of contact,” can the silks of texts surface as a pedagogical vision of an apprenticeship in creativity. *Pedagogical vision is sight/site of the yet un-scene’d*.²⁶ Beyond any theory of teaching, what we seek is to feel the outcome of *y/our* changing individual resources qua encounter with texts of pleasure. Such resources are entwined in the conversations, “concretization,” and “présentification” where teacher and student become what they strive for: life-giving discourse, or texts of bliss.

Text of pleasure ... the text that contents, fills, grants euphoria: the text that comes from culture and does not break with it, is linked to a comfortable practice of reading. Text of bliss: text that imposes a state of loss, the text that discomforts ... unsettles the reader’s historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of tastes, values, memories ... brings to a crisis ... relation with language.²⁷

What I am seeking to unfold as an apprenticeship in creativity is what Barthes said he was looking for during the preparation of his courses: “an introduction to living, a guide to life.”²⁸ This “wish for a great ‘pedagogy’ of nuance,” as Barthes dreamed, and realized as his legacies, is made up of exercises in the play of “discourse on the bit of difference,” and therein recognizing “the price of the ‘bit’” and never “denying difference,” that always resides “between being and ‘bit’.”²⁹

Without this introduction to living, without a guide to life lived creatively, the play of pedagogy merely hides its head in the sands of grainy juxtapositions of binaries.³⁰ The pedagogy of the nuance is a way to baffle paradigms, and to allow the other to unwind from the pitch of their creativity. To baffle is to allow the primal mechanism of wonder to become kick started, to experiment in imagination, to lead canned responses astray. For this to take place, teaching and/as learning must locate a fantasy. Imagine this as Bourdieu’s intermediary social space of fields.³¹

25) Friedrich Nietzsche, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man,” § 8, in *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), 71–72.

26) This would be the becoming of form. In Cassirer’s terms, it is “life visible to itself” as seeing, from the term *theoria*, and citing Fichte, “seeing is immediate life which is creative through itself.” Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, vol. 4., 28–29, 29n38, 215n76.

27) Roland Barthes, *The Pleasure of the Text*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975), 14.

28) Roland Barthes, *The Neutral: Lecture Courses at the Collège de France (1977–1978)*, trans. Rosalind E. Krauss and Denis Hollier (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 51, 11.

29) *Ibid.*, 130.

30) With Bourdieu, the habitus-field model will “go beyond” the “binary model” that he mentioned in the example of infrastructure/superstructure in historical processes. From a discussion between Manet and Courbet, Bourdieu presses for a “vision of the philosophy of the philosophy of history” that can “borrow from one’s rivals – and integrate antagonistic ideas with one’s own.” See Pierre Bourdieu, *Manet: A Symbolic Revolution*, 221, 230. Binaries include good/bad, high/low, creator/observer, timely/untimely, lasting/fleeting, classical/modern, modern/postmodern, current/passé, analytic/continental, philosophy/poetry, literature/theory, or art/non-art. This has been recently discussed by Edgar Morin as “il fatto è che nella logica binaria tecnocratica che predomina attualmente siamo incapaci di percepire questa cosa: o è lo straniero assoluto o è il fratello. Ma siamo tutti compatrioti della nostra Terra-patria.” See Eric Favereau e Thibaut Sardier, “Edgar Morin, Alain Tourain: Liberté, égalité, fraternité. Ma per tutti?” *La Repubblica*, Giovedì, 6 giugno, 2019: 29.

31) “The painter himself as part of this world” is never “alone with his work: he has other past and present painters in mind, as well as an audience” where “the public makes the picture,” to quote Duchamp. What makes a picture are all these things, and “taken together, form a field.” Bourdieu, *Manet: A Symbolic Revolution*, 262. One could here adopt Georges Perec, *Life: A User’s Manual*, trans. David Bellos (Boston: David R Godine, Publisher, 1987), and Didier Fassin’s recent, *Life: A Critical User’s Manual*.

Locating a Fantasy

What is a fantasy, and how can this support an apprenticeship in creativity? A fantasy is a multilayered process, coy, cunning, and a slow thaw of a frozen cinematic image retained in memory. Unruly as it *seams/seems*, it is very precise, and oversees how we stand or fall, fit, or not, in speaking by its structures. The work of twilled teaching as apprenticeships in creativity uses this *stand-in-speaking* as ontogenetic metaphoricity, story-telling, or “*piccole favolette*” as Vico would say, each on the way to baffle paradigms when preparing for a class, in performing what is taught/taut, or in speaking with the courage of convictions that may place one at risk. Teaching is the technique of art-making in spoken action. What I am after is a teaching, and learning, that are not a substitute held back from repression. According to Barthes, a teaching must be based on “the coming and goings of desire, which ... endlessly presents and represents” and “at the origins ... must always locate a fantasy.”³² In Adorno’s words,

[A]n exact fantasy; fantasy which abides strictly within the material which ... sciences present to it, and reaches beyond them only in the smallest aspect of the arrangement ... are aspects ... which fantasy itself must originally generate ... through a fantasy one rearranges the elements of a question.³³

What I mentioned earlier as the *x-tended* mark on a map, a trace that is present but yet-to-come, is part of the idea of fore-pleasure, yet, fore-pleasure dreams itself by the foretaste of loss. This is creative projection. Because of this projection, the split between making and observing can be eliminated, becoming instead a living text where teacher and student share an activity.³⁴ This forms the design of our sights/sites when preparing a set of texts, authors, and issues for a course. But for this, one must be open for surprise, for locations of fantasy, misreadings, neuroses, fears and phobias, and from “numinous indefiniteness into nominal definiteness”³⁵ where each is aching to find a way to-*word*, or *name*, the world of culture construed in fantasy.³⁶

32) Barthes, *The Neutral*, xiii. See also Barthes, *Album: Unpublished Correspondence and Texts*, trans. Jody Gladding (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 45, 53, <https://doi.org/10.7312/bart17986>. Of course, one will think of Socrates, and for starters see Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, 158–165.

33) Theodor W. Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” trans. Benjamin Snow. in *The Adorno Reader*, ed. Brian O’Connor (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 37. “The Actuality of Philosophy” was Adorno’s inaugural lecture given at the University of Frankfurt on May 7, 1931.

34) In complete agreement with Michel de Certeau, “*a social group is produced by producing a language ... working for the formation of a group ... collective gesture ... coproduction ... passage of the collectivity*” as in ‘traveling’ (taking a trip) ... an ... ‘evening out’ organized by friends.” See M. de Certeau, *Culture in the Plural*, trans. Luce Giard (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 140–141.

35) Hans Blumenberg, *Work on Myth*, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 25. As Moyn adds, “Naming is the founding act of culture ... splintering the abstract unity and alterity of reality.” Samuel Moyn, “Metaphorically Speaking: Hans Blumenberg, Giambattista Vico, and the Problems of Origins,” *qui parle*, 12, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2000): 58–59, <https://doi.org/10.1215/quiparle.12.1.55>.

36) As Blumenberg has it, “we understand only what we have made, and we understand other things, what we have not made, precisely by taking a detour through what we have made. Metaphor ... is, thanks to its ‘artificiality’ this detour through the self-made. To this extent, it is still, despite all the necessary care taken against idealistic pre-reflexivity, a transcendental element. Therefore it creates experience, without originating from experience.” See *Die Lesbarkeit der Welt* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981), 175.

The Orders of Pleasure

Demanding, unforgiving, masterful, passionate, self-inflicting, giving, patient. Each of these is a nuance that sheds its repressive connotations in the orders of pleasure. Pleasure has its orders. As such, it is a double order, perhaps similar to what Marcuse envisioned as the order of beauty and the order of imagination, “in conformity with laws,” but one wherein “laws that are themselves free: they are not superimposed and they do not enforce the attainment of specific ends and purposes; they are the pure form of existence itself.”³⁷ While this resounds of a utopian discourse, it is performance of an apprenticeship in creativity.³⁸ This serves as a reminder of the element of un-marketability and un-reproducibility that haunts each instantiation of a course, each class meeting, and each individual encounter with a student’s singularity.³⁹ For this to become possible, we must set ourselves within an embrasure, and this is only possible if we have drawn, or tracked, such an embrasure within the composition and continual execution of the very form and matter of a course, its texts, authors, and assignments.⁴⁰ Ways of lives are embrasures.

Embrasure

“Embrasure” will be my prevailing metaphor for the perspective of the possibility of an apprenticeship in creativity. The space of an embrasure delimits the problem of form, while the formed and delimited aperture allows space to be displaced and reconstructed. Imagine a castle interior.⁴¹ In the castle, we climb through dark interiors, lose sight of what is beyond the imposing walls, and experience a shift from our ordinary pace. The dark interior setting underlines the attraction of the narrow opening in the wall, which we come to notice by the fragmented light it intermittently casts upon the gloomy interior. It is this vision of an embrasure that allows the opening/frame of a teaching that may be *x*-tended as an introduction to living, and to the overcoming of binary busywork. It is an opening and a frame because it lets us see, take a position, and delimit the particularities of a view. In each moment, it relates our interior position and functioning as an opening and a frame. Its edges offer and impose, and this interaction allows for the variations and the possibilities of noticing difference. Embrasure is the art of the refined practice of difference. Embrasure is the shift between a continuous

37) Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 178–179.

38) Creativity as “creation is perishable; it passes because it is an act,” and it is here that we must caress what passes not into a relic, but into formations of the living. See Certeau, *Culture in the Plural*, 140. A term and developing approach by Eli Kramer would help us here, and that is to see a discourse of apprenticeship as “*eutopian*,” of and from a good-place forged from how a way of life, art, and study are in harmony. See Eli Kramer, “In Quest of Platonopolis: Excerpts from Research Visits to Philosophical Communities,” *Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture* 1, no.2 (2017): 107–115, <https://doi.org/10.26319/2919>. See 113n9.

39) This would entail a vast and profound study and recognition of social conditions, and the pressing need to name their alienation, and to recognize their “struggle for recognition.” See Bourdieu, *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, trans. Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 1999). See also Alex Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 1995), and, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory* (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 2007).

40) Bourdieu’s “double historicization” works in this fashion, “to historicize their object – the texts, documents or the artefacts they are studying – as well as their own concepts, their own intellectual tools.” *Manet: A Symbolic Revolution*, 200. See also Michel de Certeau, Chapter 4, “Universities versus Popular Culture,” in *Culture in the Plural*, 39–52.

41) I fondly recall the days spent in Warsaw during the conference, and discovering the *barbakan warszawski* (Warsaw Barbican), and settling within its embrasures for a brief respite during walks through Old Town and New Town. From my varied apprenticeships, I direct the reader to images of the embrasures in Le Corbusier’s Ronchamp Chapel of Notre Dame du Haut, in Haute-Saone, France (1950–1955), to grasp both the sacred and the profane iconicity of embrasures, the peaceful and the warring, architecturally, pedagogically, and interpersonally speaking.

edge and an environment. It is that towards which an individual moves, or is moved, forming an aperture that displaces the edges and reconstructs a find. Learning and teaching are built as these structures of findings. Embrasure is a phenomenon of art as it is of a pedagogy of aesthetic-philosophical dimensions, because of the way it frames change. It frames us as creatively modifying the determinations of aperture. Embrasure is contingent upon the implied presence of what is escaping its edges. As longing, embrasure is a phenomenon of the differing potential of its own presence persisting again as the difference that poses itself as foreign. It is the *x*-tended. Such is the beauty of pedagogical discourse that is never foreign to both sides of the embrasure. The embrasure is more than a fissure, or opening in a wall. From its angles, we go beyond the facade and into the system of life opening from it. Knowing and doing, making and observing, are here restored. This is what I call a *horizon of entrance*. This horizon of entrance conditions the experience of teaching as a performance determined of *here, through* and *beyond*, and where a course, and an apprenticeship, may remodel the strictures of its temporal and spatial position within an institution.⁴²

42) Polanyi's idea of "articulate frameworks," the "dwelling in it," "living in them," and the "breaking out" due to being overwhelmed by one's own "passionate activity" would support and further my vision of the work of the embrasure. See Michael Polanyi's, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1958), especially section 12 "The Abstract Arts," and section 13, "Dwelling in and Breaking Out," of Chapter 6, "Intellectual Passions," 193–202.

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