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The Honor-Based Society, Past and Present

Abstract:

This paper asserts that honor-based peoples have and maintain a distinct cultural identity that is valid for at least eighty-five percent of the world population. It is necessarily considered relative to dignity-based societies which make up the other fifteen percent. Practically all dignity-based cultures originated during the Enlightenment; modern honor-based groups will oftentimes through diffusion manifest some dignity-based traits or observe fewer of the traditional honor-based features. This paper will survey both traditional and modern forms of the honor-based culture.

Keywords:

honor, dignity, worth, respect, acceptance, trust, faith, merit, inherency

Introduction

All cultures, whether through law or custom, require the *trust* of their people. How cultures utilize trust, however, varies in accordance with two related but distinct tendencies, the one toward “honor” and the other toward “dignity.” Associated with this circumstance, the words trust, respect, worth, acceptance, and faith are also found to function differently between the same two cultural types.

Trust and faith are often ultimately based upon degrees of familiarity with persons or facts, respectively. Familiarity can breed caring and/or deliver experience. For honor to breed trust requires experience. Dignity, on the other hand, relies on the faith in select facts, such as the fact of being human. The trust-dependent honor is

rooted in biology and is occasionally referred to as (unfortunately) “irrational,” whereas fact-based dignity would be termed “rational” despite its dependence on faith. With biological trust one expects prior credible evidence of trustworthiness, whether from respectability, honor (via esteem), or deeds. Trust and respect breed one another, and *honor* is the commonly observed result. The leitmotif of this article is that most cultures value in particular trust, respect and *merited* worth, and we shall therefore refer to these as “honor-based” (H-B) cultures.

Traditional honor-based cultures may or may not possess the word “honor” to describe themselves, yet we can be sure that honor nonetheless follows upon trustworthiness, respectability and good deeds. The good feeling one has in attaining such desiderata is shared by observers likewise, who hold these acts and their performer(s) in esteem. These feelings are the indication of honor even in modern H-B societies where the word may be in abeyance. “Though ‘honor’ may be an outmoded term in modern English, its modern analogues – esteem, respect, recognition, dignity, status, prestige, deference, face, image, etc. – still shape the dynamics of human social interaction.”¹ The good feeling one has about *possessing* honor, and its worth, is related to “dignity.” We accordingly propose two cultural types: the honor-based (H-B) and the dignity-based (D-B).

It is important to appreciate that the “rational” fact-based dignity is not devoid of caring. It directly implies sympathy, empathy, and identification with people *in general*. This fact of caring for humanity results in the doctrine of “inherent” worth. The experience-based trust refers to specific acts and stands on the doctrine of merited worth. While honor-based peoples value their kind, they often devalue those outside of their society. But the dignity-based rational caring extends (in theory) universally. Dignity is *accepted* on *faith* largely because with faith there is not much in the way of evidence, nor is there a particular need for it. What there will be is a fact-based rational *ideology* that supports the notion of universal dignity such that everyone is entitled to acceptance for being human. These are tenets of the dignity-based (D-B) culture.

From these considerations, we obtain our two rules of thumb: honor-based (H-B) groups especially value trust, respect, and merited worth; while the dignity-based (D-B) value faith, acceptance, and inherent worth. The first is often more active in its philosophy, urging valorous deeds which give rise to esteem, respect, and honor, whence to trustworthiness; the second is more passive, urging considerations in favor of general well-being throughout mankind. The first relies (in traditional societies) on culture to govern behavior, whereas the latter relies on laws less to keep people in line than to recapitulate at all points the reigning ideology. Modern H-B law commits culture to writing, some of which over the course of time may or may not take on a D-B cast, featuring the “rule of law,” for example. All the same, a realpolitik appraisal will inform us that law becomes necessary, independent of cultural type, to assure order, justice, and the exercise of the freedoms supported by a large society’s cultural legacy.

Part I – Clarifications

We find ten items that together put muscle to the bone. The first concerns the rationale for cultural distinctions in the first place. Does not every culture value honor, dignity, respect, acceptance, earned, and inherent worth? But consider this question: Does not everyone “accept” their spouses and children? Yet they accept these two classes far more than they accept most other things. The issue is not that we apply words selectively, but that our use falls into general patterns. In the present context we are talking about the respect solely dependent upon esteem, and acceptance solely in terms of dignity – the fact that it is accepted unconditionally.

Of course, all D-B (dignity-based) individuals “respect” everyone’s inherent worth and dignity. But this respect comes in the form of acceptance, the kind of acceptance that the honor-based do *not* put at the top of

1) University of Edinburgh, “Honour in Classical Greece.”

their list of valuations. Nor do typical H-B groups put much stock in worth that is inherent. They value merited worth. Everyone values honor and dignity, but differently. Yet for all concerned, the general rule is that *dignity is the backbone of honor, and honor is the face of dignity*. In this context, dignity puts a break on the “loudness” of honor. Where it does not, then the dignity is itself “loud,” which can introduce problems in an H-B culture.

A second consideration concerns the use of a binary typology. Quite a few researchers refuse to entertain such a methodology, but for reasons that are simply mistaken.² Orit Kamir, one of the few writing in the area of honor and dignity, characterizes these cultural types as follows: “I believe that comparatively viewed as potentially competing, adversary, fundamental notions, honor and dignity emerge as two antithetical bases of unique value systems.”³ This is a tad severe and feeds the arguments of the binary naysayers. In her support, she was comparing the traditional American “Old West” honor-based law with modern D-B law in the film *Unforgiven*. But very few modern cultural side-by-side comparisons would find the H-B and D-B as being overall “antithetical.”

Just before, honor and dignity were described: defined as polarities in which each pole is brought into relation with the other. Cultures exist on a continuum, every culture featuring both honor and dignity, with almost all of them valuing one term “significantly” over the other. Morris R. Cohen explains the “principle of polarity”:

By this I mean that opposites such as immediacy and mediation, unity and plurality, the fixed and the flux, substance and function, ideal and real, actual and possible, etc., like the north (positive) and south (negative) poles of a magnet, *all involve each other* when applied to any significant entity.⁴

The third item is discussed by Francis Fukuyama in his book *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*.⁵ It concerns the relation between trust and law. He makes the argument that laws and rules generally militate against, or otherwise reveal a lack of, trust.

People who do not trust one another will end up cooperating only under a system of formal rules and regulations, which have to be negotiated, agreed to, litigated, and enforced, sometimes by coercive means. This legal apparatus, serving as a substitute for trust, entails what economists call ‘transaction costs.’⁶

Except for sociopaths, everyone is able to trust and display faith and, except for circumstances where they have the abnormal desire to violate the law, will exhibit these values.

“No one will dispute,” wrote Rousseau in *The Social Contract*, “that the General Will is in each individual a *pure act of the understanding*, which *reasons* while the passions are silent on what a man may demand of his neighbor and on what his neighbor has a right to demand of him.”⁷ It is in large part the rational understanding of the basis of these laws and rules that make them successful and which neither reduce, nor reflect the absence of, trust. What we have here is a faith in the terms and conditions of a contract. By itself, the contract stands as

2) See for example Ostrom, “Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development.”

3) Kamir, “Honor and Dignity in the Film,” 194. Kamir is following the lead of Pierre Bourdieu, who remarked, “The ethos of honor is fundamentally opposed to a universal and formal morality which affirms the equality in dignity of all men.” Bourdieu, “The Sentiment of Honor in Kabyle Society,” 228.

4) Cohen, *Reason and Nature*, 165–66. My emphasis.

5) Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues*.

6) *Ibid.*, 27.

7) Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses*, xlix. My stress.

a “proto-D-B” concept which, with other similar examples, may inspire or define the full D-B doctrine. Even policies adopted out of expediency can fall under this heading.⁸

Law is only for those requiring it. Violators of another’s trust (regarding “common pool resources”) are called “free-riders.” Elinor Ostrom (1933–2012) won a Nobel prize in economics in large part for demonstrating that traditional H-B cultures practicing face-to-face understandings of cultural values will rarely manifest a free-riding tendency.⁹ The real issue for free-riding is in the modern societies of both types. Where there is faith in rules reflecting an ideology (whether cultural or legal), there will be very little free-riding. Where there is a healthy sense of community trust – the foundation of “social capital” – there is little free-riding.

Americans obey traffic regulations less because of laws and rules than because they long ago rationalized that these are necessary for safety on our roads. The laws simply restate a component of the ideologically accepted norms. Baldly stated, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) can posit *faith* that Americans will pay their taxes.¹⁰ But the reason that the IRS can exercise faith is because Americans place *faith* in laws that frame the common ideology.

Like Rousseau (with Locke and Hobbes), the “founding fathers” elaborated a contract of sorts, one which precedes evidence that what the contract specifies will be upheld by all parties. It is taken on *faith* that the other parties to the contract can be trusted to follow through if they sign on to the contract. They are protected at law only to protect believers from free-riders, those who would take advantage by violating the contract. H-B cultures can be trusted to support laws that demonstrate their *utility*, the D-B by faith in laws reflecting their *ideology*. Generally speaking, the H-B societies have more a *cultural* ideology than a legal one.

Most H-B societies came to the contract only slowly and with reservations at that. They had not had previous experience with the other parties to a given contract, who lacked an evidence-based rationale for their trustworthiness. Valuing trust as they do, they rejected contracts for a time. To build trust in Taiwan, for example, “Guan-xi (qwon-she) means connections/personal relationships. It is developed over a long period of time and influences social, political, and commercial relationships. The spoken word is the contract.”¹¹

Legal historian Henry Sumner Maine once quipped, “the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement *from Status to Contract*.”¹² From the time of tribes onward, honor-based society tended to be hierarchical, and one’s status within it helped to determine one’s worth and honor. For the D-B set the contract was duck soup,¹³ not so for the H-B. Of course, many cultures recognize and use both faith and trust; the reality, however, is that they have differing preferences as to which of those words best characterize their belief system of values.

The fourth point is a result of the polarity principle – a relation that would have saved Friedrich Nietzsche a good bit of open embarrassment. Every person, community, and nation is a composite of the two cultural types. Failing to grasp this fact, Nietzsche presumed that the Dionysian and Apollinian (his spelling) types

8) Many significant H-B policies fall under the heading. But they remain H-B where there remains overwhelming commitment to trust, respect, and merited worth. Some modern H-B states also grant universal dignity, in which case they become “transitional.” Rome developed what is to all intents and purposes a dignity-like legal system from several instances of expedient policymaking. The *jus gentium*, for example, presupposed universal rights to partake in an internationally applied set of rules governing their interactions. A legal system based on individual rights is for my purposes D-B. See *Wikipedia*, “jus gentium.” Of course, few would dare deny that Rome was in fact a cult of dignity writ large.

9) Ostrom, “Polycentric Governance of Complex Systems.” See also *Nobelprize.org*, Nobel Media. Consult also Ostrom, *Governing the Commons*.

10) “While people may complain about their taxes, researchers report that Americans are more likely to pay them than residents of most other countries.” Scott, “American Tax System?”

11) *eDiplomat*, Taiwan: Cultural Etiquette.

12) Maine, *Ancient Law*, 165. Italics in original.

13) The most easily accomplished objective. The expression came from the title of a movie comedy by the Marx Brothers.

represented an all or nothing presence in any given person. Thus, for him Richard Wagner was the ideal human, a Dionysian personality. Goethe, however, was a sentimental loser for being an Apollinian. All went swimmingly until he discovered that his revered composer was an anti-Semite. Nietzsche self-immolated in the preface of the second edition of the book in which he espoused his theory (*The Birth of Tragedy*). Duly shamed, he set the record straight in *The Gay Science*.

Different expressions of this idea do exist. In any given society, for example, whether it be primarily honor-based or dignity-based, the economic and war-making sides will usually be honor-based. It is the honor of a merchant in a traditional society to use true weights, for example. They can be trusted to be honorable for to fail is to incur shame and ostracism. Haggling, where it exists, is a game of “I respect you, you respect me; once we respect one another we will likely reach the correct price.” War is waged under rules observed via an honor code. The United States happens to be D-B in the North (and both coasts) and comparatively H-B in the Southeast.¹⁴ The North so outweighs the population of the Southeast as to force the D-B as the clear winner. Add to that the D-B legal maxims that both cultural types support and you see why America is, as a whole, nominally dignity-based.

One finds the occasional person who cannot understand how worth can be inherent (philosopher Charles Hartshorne, for example).¹⁵ Many in modern H-B societies are coming around to inherent dignity but still value respect and trust far more than do dignity-based folk. Some of these groups are transitional on the way to a full dignity-based outlook while just as many others will go no further. All of which confirms that people can and do carry both kinds of traits.

Fifth, there is an ontology to the honor-dignity binary that must be understood lest the theory seem incomplete. The H-B condition is the default to which we are all born. Everything that characterizes the D-B lifestyle must be learned, and it must struggle at times to unseat the old H-B dispositions toward intolerance and whatnot. Cultures are likewise. They were birthed in a difficult world where their membership was compelled to work with one another to the greatest extent possible. Stability and order were paramount. Thinking in lockstep was the result of the danger and hardship. It required respect and trust from all toward all. Honor came from meritorious work toward group success and survival. These lessons were not readily lost or given up, even as life became gradually less severe.

In the early tribal phase *offices* came into existence, again from necessity, but the development saw the evolution of stewardship norms of which there were and remain four: ensure the highest quality of output; utilize the best techniques and management procedures; be worthy of the clients’ trust; and do no harm. The military, religious, and medical brotherhoods all assumed their appointed offices, as did elected or nominated leaders. These offices represented the “cult of honor.” They were ideally the expression of the very best society could offer itself, never mind it was difficult to meet expectations then as now. The cult was a slice of the best ideas raised upon a pedestal and revered. The offices were in a way sacred. They were also the source of later D-B policies.

Dignity, in the form of proto-D-B traits, is born from the bowels of honor cults where it is introduced to the four stewardship principles. But as F. C. S. Schiller wryly noted, “All human institutions have a way of growing into perversions of their original purpose that block its attainment... . Those who run the institutions are allowed to acquire interests that conflict with the professed purpose of the institutions they serve.”¹⁶

14) “Southern states of the U.S. have higher violent crime rates than the rest of the country. Moreover, Southern men may be more willing to stand up for themselves using physical aggression – particularly if they have been insulted, or believe their homes are threatened. This phenomenon is referred to as a ‘culture of honor.’” See Barber, “Southern Culture of Honor?”

15) I spent the summer of 1997 with Hartshorne at his home in Austin, Texas. Hartshorne was, nonetheless, a liberal’s liberal, which would normally situate him straightaway with the dignity-based people. In fact, he was an especially enlightened honor-based man.

16) Schiller, *Logic for Use*, 2. Herder enunciated the same concern: “We perceive *how transitory all human structures are, nay how*

By and by, some cults of honor were transformed into “cults of dignity,” in which the powerful sing the praises of liberty and eudaemonia is sung from the rooftops while those in charge take the first fruits and neglect all out-groups. *Theirs is the only dignity that counts.*

The fascists best define the dignity-cult essentials, those who have campaigned on change and then proceeded to rule autocratically through police states. It is out from such negative states of affairs that normative dignity must rear up and win the day. That this is not easily accomplished is found in the evidence of nominally D-B states that fail to deliver services that are natural to, indeed inherent to, most traditional H-B societies. Loss of the honor cult amounts to the loss of future D-B principles. For the attainment of true dignity, life in society must come to emulate the cult of honor in its offices.

Times were when whole societies were cults of dignity. Today we find evidence of it even in the American Congress, which has so organized matters that the popular vote no longer matters so much to men and women intent on feeding the hungry mouths of lobbyists’ chosen interest groups. This is how they pay for their re-election bids, which are nearly always successful. Only some twenty percent of seats are actually up for grabs in any one election cycle. Companies are sometimes cults of dignity, as for example Enron (of the California energy crisis memory). Some of the modern H-B illiberal societies are beginning to look rather like cults of dignity. In this case the voters have purchased tickets to the affair, democracy working against its own principles. Marx would be pleased. What appears as the “in-group” is the disaffected and intolerant nationalistic lot, the same that elected Donald Trump. It is in some respects the underbelly of the H-B moiety.

The sixth consideration finds us looking for the spiritual criteria that help us in fully defining the honor-based and dignity-based societies. Christianity is a dignity-based religion (the New Testament, that is). Protestantism in particular, with the doctrine of grace, illustrates man’s worthiness to be accepted (on faith?) by a loving god. All one requires is to be sincere in asking. This naturally extends the condition of worthiness to all of humankind. Clearly, when religion mentions the inherent dignity of all, we know the society is either nominally dignity-based or, in the absence of legal justification (and with continuing high regard for respect), trust and merited worth, it remains what it always was, honor-based.

Given that religion is a prominent source of moral thought, we can return to Rousseau’s *Social Contract* in which he writes, “this multitude is so united in one body, it is impossible to offend against one without attacking the body, and still more to offend against the body without the members resenting it.”¹⁷ The honor or dishonor of one redounds to the whole; a slight to the whole may bring it to the brink of fisticuffs, feud, or war. This is traditional honor-based behavior. He also remarked, “he who judges of morality judges of honor; and he who judges of honor finds his law in opinion.”¹⁸ If the practice appears H-B, and religion is used to advance such opinions, we can presume an H-B society. Religion is rarely used in this way in a D-B society, since their ideology is considered a legal matter more than a religious one.

For the seventh item we deal with the legal criteria for cultural classification. The H-B legal system tends toward conservatism, meaning that it is: 1) non-pluralist; 2) egalitarian (minimalized inequality of income, equitable access to housing and employment); 3) moralistic; and 4) normative (adherence to a variation on “natural law” and “higher law” theory). By moralistic is meant that custom, recognizing, and validating (instinctual, inherent) human nature, defines what is moral. The legal system itself is non-liberal, meaning that it is not totally independent of political will, and that it upholds legislative determinations of political policy at the expense of the rule of law and the defense of rights.

oppressive the best institutions become in the course of a few generations.” von Herder, Reflections on Mankind, 163. Italics in original.

17) Rousseau, *Social Contract*, Bk. 1, ch. 7.

18) Ibid., Bk. 4, ch. 7.

The D-B legal system can be considered “liberal.” As such, it is ideally 1) pluralistic; 2) egalitarian; 3) ethicistic; and 4) normative (adherence to ideology of inherent dignity). By ethicistic is meant a standard of “the good life,” “the normative life,” as opposed to naturalistic/traditional/cultural (moralistic) standards of behavior or conduct.¹⁹ The highest law of the land, the Constitution, will likely dictate D-B principles. The United States, France, the UK, Germany and others are among an increasing list. But there is more to D-B law. For example, the sayings, “a nation of laws, not of men,” and “innocent until proven guilty” are classic D-B doctrines. So also is “the rule of law” and Jefferson’s “all men are created equal.”

Modern *law* has drawn many societies away from the H-B system and into a transitional stage, possibly on the way to a fully dignity-based system. Accepting an injury to one person as an injury to society as a whole is the logic behind H-B *criminal* law. Here, the injury is in everyone losing honor as much or more than any other rationale. The dignity-based equivalent features more the threat of harm – physical harm – to a wider population.

In *civil* law, however, we depart from all of this; injuring one person’s property or interests does not extend to others. Rather, it is a matter strictly between the person injuring and those actually injured. Civil law presumes the autonomy of the actors involved, their unique right to security and the unique responsibility to keep from harming others. There is very little to extend outward to others. Civil law makes individuals the center of attention. Even in class action lawsuits the collective is viewed as an aggregate of individuals having been threatened or injured. When in a traditional H-B community a sorcerer faces the potential sentence of death, it is typically because the community was at risk. Civil law is to all intents and purposes dignity-based law.

Dignity presumes the autonomy of the individual no less than it demands justice for every individual. From here it is a short step to the doctrine that each individual has the inherent right based on dignity to compel the legal system on his or her behalf. The D-B legal system is designed to assure *rights* to the individual; its ideology declares all persons to be possessed of inherent dignity. Modern H-B societies operate under modern laws as well, of course, but *not* because everyone possesses inherent dignity.

The eighth item involves the nature of respect. In both cultural types respect can be seen as positive, where the extremity is reverence, or negative, where the extremity is fear. In both types there is self-respect and other-respect; in some cultures, self-respect is valued more than other-respect, where in the majority it is the other way around. The H-B cultures variously value “quiet” and “loud” respect. The quiet variation is associated with the value of stability, where one respects what procures and maintains stability and order – what in sociological terms makes for a “tight” society.²⁰ Most of the H-B societies are quiet in this regard. The other view of respect values loud traits (boisterousness, for example).²¹ Japan will be comparatively quiet (tight), whereas Russia will be comparatively loud (loose). Both of these cultures are intermediate mixed, with Russia sporting a dignity cult.

This differential is related to the experience of the culture – whether, it has had to respond to many difficult circumstances or not.²² If so, the tendency is toward a quiet (tight) interpretation of respect. If not, then it will more likely be loud (loose). While this is a generalization, it is backed up by empirical evidence. Researchers view collectivism and tightness as related but distinct cultural dimensions.²³

19) Ronald Dworkin argued as follows: “An ethical judgment makes a claim about what people should do to live well: what they should aim to be, and achieve in their own lives. A moral judgment makes a claim about how people must treat other people.” See Dworkin, *Justice for Hedgehogs*, 25.

20) Gelfand et al., “Between Tight and Loose Cultures.”

21) Van Kleef et al., “Breaking the Rules to Rise to Power.”

22) Gelfand et al., “Differences Between Tight and Loose Cultures.”

23) Gelfand, Nishii, and Raver, “On Cultural Tightness-Looseness.”

Next, the ninth issue: am I picking sides here? No. Here are the relevant realities: there exists an historical tendency for many H-B societies having contact with D-B societies to gradually convert to the D-B system. That process is still happening, if slowly. Cultures do not change stripes overnight. Nonetheless, the H-B presently have the stage almost completely to themselves. Western Europe, Scandinavia and nearly all of the common law countries are D-B.

Both cultural types have their expressions of nobility and virtue. In the honor-based groups virtue achieves the merited worth that brings esteem and honor. Their claim to nobility is determined by what they have done with their honor, and they have done a lot, mostly by infusing their culture with the riches of the arts and sciences that have through the ages fed the rest of us. The dignity-based shed their blood with attendant virtue in order to achieve the political preconditions of universal dignity. Their claim to nobility is the faith in humankind that a substantial portion of humanity now respects, coupled with granting to dignity the tools of acceptance and faith, tolerance and openness, needed to enhance happiness.

What benefits does each side bring to the table? As mentioned, the H-B are more realistic; they also are more charming and know how to dance and sing the night away. They love their children dearly. Show them a basis for trust and you will have a friend forever. The fame of their hospitality precedes them. They are easy-going and laid back. They wage war to win, by any means available, making them formidable foes. At their best, the dignity-based are tolerant, open-minded, fair-minded, and less likely to be biased in their judgments. They are accountable to others in airing their “dirty laundry” (courtesy of a free press).

Lastly, I mention what is doubtless first in practical importance. The workaday world of the traditional honor-based, those living in simple traditional bands, prior to complex tribal society, evidenced policies that are the equivalent to the idealized dignity-based peoples. If anyone was hungry it was because all were hungry; in coastal areas everyone pitched in for any other family’s house or boat, so all had shelter and means of travel. The spirits guarding health or promoting disease were presumed to fall equally upon all. Generally speaking, no one lacked what assistance was available. These, like the honor cults, are the source of future D-B ideals.

The only difference between these amenities and the ideals of the D-B contingent is this: the H-B accomplished these things more because they were necessary to an orderly and stable society than because they were super ideas – though they often were just that; the effects were salutary and cost little or nothing to implement. Many of these notions survived the hundreds of years into modernity, so that the European states once associated with H-B hierarchical monarchies have become the most dignity-based of all peoples. What came “naturally” became as well the “right thing to do.” Orderliness and stability were now less important than the considerations demanded of dignity. However, some nominally D-B states such as the U. S. have yet to fully learn and appreciate this lesson.

Part II – The Classification of Traditional Honor-based Societies²⁴

The following is the general classification schema:

Quiet Cultures: Cooperative / Competitive

Intermediate Cultures: Composite / Mixed

Loud Cultures: Dignity cult / Caudillo

24) The material in this section, including some excerpts, is reliant on an article of roughly the same title by the author. See Herrman, “The Classification of Honor-Based Societies.”

Quiet Cultures: The prerequisite to a study of honor-based cultures is to apprehend and appreciate the distinction intended by the words “quiet” and “loud.” In general, they refer to the mode of expressing or otherwise indicating the state or condition of one’s *dignity*. The cultural default is that dignity is “quiet,” in the sense of restrained, “dignified.” A Japanese blogger spoke truthfully for her culture in describing American speech and personality –

大声 (おおごえ ohgoe) – loud – loud literally and loud as in opinionated
大げさ (おおげさ ohgesa) – exaggerated, exaggerates, over-dramatic.²⁵

In a quiet cooperative culture (typical of bands or lower-level tribal structures devoid of dignity cults), the emphasis is above all on avoidance of disorder or instability in interpersonal relations. With individualism comes elevated competitiveness with louder expressions. Intermediate societies are “mixed” when identifiable groups reflect quiet on the one hand and loudness on the other. The “intermediate-composite” sub-type implies that quiet and loud are thoroughly intermingled and broadly distributed throughout the culture. The loud societies are therefore those that have without question left the struggle of quiet standards, and where loud traits are accepted throughout the culture with little muss or fuss.

Cooperative Quiet Traits²⁶

Collective Honor

All have the right to seek and claim honor; individuals represent the honor of their respective groups; success or failure reflects on the group and vice versa; one is neither “boss” nor “better” than anyone else; egalitarian principles are adhered to; all are entitled to food and shelter; cooperation is the desired way to achieve corporate goals; decisions on group action are expected to be unanimous.

Compulsive Conformity

Parsimony, humility, and modesty ground conformity; there is minor (if any) emphasis on dominance, achievement, aspiration, or initiative; nails are pounded down (standing out is discouraged); criticism is unstated or understated.

Composition and Discord

These groups are typically without political leadership factions; kin groups or interpersonal agreements effectuate customs; from quarrels to serious breaches of code, the object of social structure is peace and tranquility; there is a premium on the avoidance of risk and especially of discord and dysfunction; wrongdoers ask for and receive forgiveness; envy, jealousy, and competitiveness are discouraged.

Us Versus Them Attitudes

There is self-glorification and contempt for strangers; outsiders and the upper-classes are subject to a degree of criticism bordering on antagonism; there can be isolationism and xenophobia; strangers may also, however, offer opportunity to demonstrate hospitality.

25) Maki, “Americans are Big and Loud.” Accessed 9/22/2016.

26) Modified from Herrman, “The Classification of Honor-Based Societies,” 9–10.

Authority without Power

True authority reflects an obligation to society and is absent executive prerogative, influencing instead through respect;²⁷ “powered” authority enters from outside and is inherently dangerous; material power requires spiritual power.

Status and Respect

Respect builds honor; status derives from it and is granted indulgences. Elders usually earn the highest status and the greatest respect; respect and cooperation are a composite of quiet traits working through kin and para-kin groups; thin-skinned disposition generally dependent on degree of individualism.

Work Ethic

A siesta approach to work and rest; patient expectation for reality to act; indifference to time or punctuality; tendency to leave matters unfinished or unrepaired; disapproval of high aspiration as being a challenge to fate; indiscriminate use of money; “some things just happen.”

Ideals

Independence and autonomy; generosity; hospitality; not quarrelsome, not aggressive, not striving; behaves properly regarding rules determining both his own nature and society as a whole.

Every one of these, including to a lesser extent the very last, will change with the advent of competition in the society. The reliance on public opinion is actually at its greatest in the smallest moieties. Competition in quiet societies maintains all of the cooperative traits but with enough modification that we will list the traits as we did for the cooperative.

This corresponds reasonably well with Rousseau’s description (in *The Social Contract*) of a democratic moiety, one in which there are comparatively few members, let us say under three or four hundred, and where most people know one another. There we will find:

Great simplicity of manners, to prevent business from multiplying and raising thorny problems; next, a large measure of equality in rank and fortune, without which equality of rights and authority cannot long subsist; lastly, little or no luxury – for luxury either comes of riches or makes them necessary; it corrupts at once rich and poor ... it sells the country to softness and vanity, and takes away from the State all its citizens, to make them slaves to one another, and one and all to public opinion.²⁸

I have stated that individualism is related to competitiveness.

Over time individualism is not only favored but becomes endemic; as it colors effort and economy, it likewise tends toward *competition*, especially where the immaterial values of honor, prestige and status are at stake. The two societies to be discussed below meet these criteria, making the task one of defining and distinguishing the cooperative from the competitive features common to the respective “quiet” classes.²⁹

27) Miller, “Two Concepts of Authority.”

28) Rosseau, *Social Contract*, Bk. 3, ch. 4.

29) Modified from Herrman, “The Classification of Honor-Based Societies,” 10.

The mountain Arapesh serve as an example of the cooperative quiet society. The Canadian Ojibwa will represent the quiet competitive classification. As reported by Margaret Mead, the Arapesh leader is one who “shows an all-round capacity for devotion to the community ends, one who is able and willing to lead in spite of a native dislike for leadership, one who is hospitable, wise, gentle, unquarrelsome, and intelligent in the sense that he is able to understand the ends of his society and to carry them out.”³⁰ Sanctions in Arapesh are levied against those who provoke anger.³¹ In growing up they are not taught to take initiative or to take charge of their environment.³²

Competitive Quiet Traits³³

Collective Honor

No one is either “boss” or “better” than anyone else. One is limited to the right to expect respect with merit, but no further, for competition presumes status differentials, especially where the group has become tribal. Egalitarian norms are, in principle, still adhered to; all are entitled to food and shelter. Cooperation remains the desired way to achieve corporate goals, but pure democratic decision-making is now the exception rather than the rule. Individual as well as social independence and autonomy, generosity, and hospitality remain or become still more important.

Conformity

Humility and modesty are admirable but no longer ground conformity. There is varying emphasis on dominance, achievement, aspiration, or initiative which supervenes over strict conformity; standing out is no longer discouraged in knee-jerk fashion; criticism is evident but subdued.

Composition and Discord

It seems that competitiveness is frequently correlated with some mode of formal governance: kin groups or interpersonal agreements effectuate customs; from quarrels to serious breaches of code, the object of social structure is peace and tranquility; avoidance of risk; and especially of discord and dysfunction; envy and jealousy are now an understated norm; serious quarrels are still handled by families but now there are likely to be mediators associated with local governance.

Us Versus them Attitudes

Self-glorification, other contempt; strangers, outsiders and upper-classes subject to a degree of aggrandizement; less isolationism and more involvement with neighboring groups; xenophobia; strangers may also, however, offer opportunity to demonstrate hospitality.

Authority without Power

True authority still reflects an obligation to society but executive prerogative is now occasionally apparent.

30) Mead, “The Arapesh of New Guinea,” 40.

31) Ibid., 42.

32) Ibid., 47.

33) Modified from Herrman, “The Classification of Honor-Based Societies,” 11–12.

Status and Respect

Respect builds honor; status derives from it and is granted indulgences. Elders usually earn the highest status and the greatest respect; respect and cooperation are a composite of quiet traits working through kin and para-kin groups; and a thin-skinned disposition generally dependent on degree of individualism.

Work Ethic

There remains a siesta approach to work and rest but with more expectation to see initiative; there is still indifference to time or punctuality, and a tendency to leave matters unfinished or unrepaired; disapproval of high aspiration is no longer a challenge to fate.

Ideals

Personal ideals mesh with social ideals. Security and stability are somewhat less important than previously. The means for food, and peace with neighbors, are ideals. With competitiveness private goods production increases and gradually, for some societies, becomes an ideal. Private property is born.

The Canadian Ojibwa are “quiet-competitive,” an intensely individualistic society stressing private ownership of everything from hunting grounds to songs and dances. The evidence that they are a quiet society is revealed in these points:

- 1) Authority is respected, not feared; power or coercion are rare or nonexistent. The captain of a war party has no authority to compel participation in a raid.
- 2) The Ojibwa avoid so much as a disagreement: “It is unlikely, however, that a woman would seed rice if her husband objected strenuously, not because she felt his authority, but because she would choose to avoid ill-feeling in the household.”³⁴
- 3) Those with more to offer are expected to give when asked.

As is common in quiet-competitive societies, pride in winning or victory is a boon to self-respect and confidence. “A boy’s life is full of never-ending incentives to personal achievement. A man aspires for renown in the male activities of shamanism, hunting, and war, in all or in some of these; and loses status if he is permanently unsuccessful. Only heedless young men ... are foolish enough to guffaw at one another.”³⁵ This “point-of-honor reaction presupposes competitiveness. Competitiveness is also presumed from the existence of joking relationships, which reflect the need to maintain relationships between people who otherwise would be banned by a taboo.³⁶ Marriages reflect competition in being brittle, “fairly short and very stormy.”³⁷ Men feel humiliation keenly and will devote themselves to revenge.

Common, and indeed essential to the “quiet” classification is the presence of institutional means of severely truncating “loud” behavior. This will not be characteristic of the next category.

34) Landes, “Ojibwas,” 96.

35) Ibid., 114, 118, 123.

36) A. R. Radcliffe-Brown informs us that the ‘joking’ relationship – “can be regarded as a kind of friendliness expressed by a show of hostility. The mutual abusive behavior would be simple hostility in other connections, but the joking relatives, ruled by convention, and the friendliness is exhibited in the readiness not to take offence but to respond in the same way. The social separation of the man and his wife’s relatives is symbolically represented in the sham hostility, ruled by convention, and the friendliness is exhibited in the readiness not to take offense.” See Radcliffe-Brown, “Introduction,” 57. See also Radcliffe-Brown, *Structure and Function*, 90–116.

37) Landes, “Ojibwas,” 104.

The Intermediate Class: Composite and Mixed Sub-types³⁸

The composite designation refers to groups who combine quiet and loud behavior across the society. The mixed sub-type indicates two (or more) sub-groups within the society, the one which is predominately quiet, and the other that is without question “louder.”

The Ammassalik Eskimos of Greenland are matriarchal and, like most Eskimo groups, are also individualistic. They belong to the intermediate *composite* class. They combine quiet and loud traits throughout their culture. Quiet traits include the usual lack of political structures; headmen are severely limited in the extent of their authority; unlike other Eskimo groups the Ammassaliks do not engage in competitive sports, nor in shamanistic contests. But the ideal Eskimo is,

One who is outstanding in skill, in strength, in power, a man who expresses his personality fully and without being deterred by economic, social, or supernatural sanctions. Such a man can take what he wants without fear, he can do as he pleases without being checked or ostracized, he is at once a terror and a pride.³⁹

Clearly, these are endemic loud traits. That they constitute an *ideal* indicates that the tendency is culture-wide.

The more powerful men partake of wife-stealing in a culture where she is a categorical necessity. “By far the greater number of marriages are concluded by the simple act of a man’s taking a woman, whether it be from her father or her husband. Women are taken by force, with the rewards going to the most powerful man.”⁴⁰

As an example of a mixed sub-group, the Lakalai is a traditional people on New Britain, a volcanic island. It features a majority with quiet traits and a smaller distinct faction characterized by their loud traits, recognized as such by the majority group. In Charles A. Valentine’s 1963 study the loud contingent are:

Individuals who become angry frequently, easily, or without appropriate cause. Such persons are quick to take offense, ready to participate in quarrels, and easily moved to physical violence. [These] individuals [are] regarded as being highly sexed, greatly interested in sexual activities, and uninhibited in their expression of this interest. It is said that persons in this category may spend so much time and energy in intercourse that they become tired out, hollow-eyed, and even ill.⁴¹

As for men of shame and silence, these words together connote:

“A man who sits silent.” Their more general significance can be represented as “a man who is not talkative,” “a man who conducts himself *quietly*.” From one point of view, “man of propriety” ... the idea of “good conduct” which is expressed here evokes explicit approval and positive ethical valuation.⁴²

It need not be stressed how perfectly this fits with the “quiet” style.

38) The classification of the intermediate class is reversed here from what it is in the article The Classification of Honor-Based Societies. In the present article the “composite” subgroup distributes quiet and loud traits intermixed throughout the entire group and does not restrict loud traits to a specific and identifiable subgroup. In this presentation the “mixed” subgroup has two separate and distinct subgroups one of which is loud and the other of which is quiet. I believe the change makes good sense and will eliminate a degree of confusion.

39) Mirsky, “The Eskimo of Greenland,” 73.

40) Ibid., 67.

41) Valentine, “Men of Anger and Men of Shame,” 445.

42) Ibid., 446, my emphasis.

The Loud Class: Cult of Dignity and Caudillo⁴³

Loud Traits

Individual Honor

Honor fulfills ideal behavior, not average expectations; the honorable man is the 'protagonist' of his group; results and success may take precedence over downstream effects on others; he looks others in the face and applies mannered proprieties to avoid arguments or feuds; he will often feel it necessary to guard against slights.

Personality

Insecurity of constant public evaluation may breed a flood of self-assertion; these people are risk-friendly: rogues and adventurers are welcome. Working from agonistic values one can: possess boundless self-confidence; the stress on competition breeds jealousy; one asserts superiority or the right to equal esteem; prerogative is the desire to overcome a rival; and at the maximum level immodesty, humility, and meekness are appropriate only for women.

Individuality

There is indulgence toward boastful conduct; dependence is greatly feared; oaths expose one to public oversight; the individual personality is of the highest value; and as a general rule private ownership of property is the norm.

Ideals

The core ideals come from the same collection of societies used above, with the addition that the objective of society is often to ensure the maintenance of power in the upper class and/or governing factions. It is also the case that many societies value political independence and a socially oriented system of governance.

The Dignity Cult

A criterion of the loud honor-based society is that it collectively buys into loud behavior. For the Ifugao of the Philippines, loud is marked by aggressiveness, the antics of shrewdness, and often accompanied by behavior reflecting points of honor. What distinguishes the Ifugao cult of dignity from the intermediate class is the evidence of group-based defense of privilege sometimes with the advertisement that such dignity has been purchased – and thus their prestige vouchsafed. “The very wealthy ... have validated their position by giving elaborate and costly feasts to their poor neighbors.”⁴⁴

A second frequently observed characteristic is that little or no attempt is made to limit downstream negative influences upon lower classes, who value and respect wealth and status. In traditional society the cult is usually the land-owning group, whereas in modern societies it is likely to be the governing or commercial groups. The cult presumes a special dignity unto itself: whereas the cult assesses a 100% interest rate, such does not apply within and between the wealthy groups. “‘And don't charge me interest,’ wrote one wealthy Canaanite to another, in a tablet dated 1200 B. C., ‘after all, we are both gentlemen.’”⁴⁵ The club secures itself at all cost.

43) Modified from Herrman, “The Classification of Honor-Based Societies,” 8.

44) Goldman, “The Ifugao,” 161.

45) Graeber, *Debt*, 86.

Republican and Imperial Rome, Homeric and early classical Greece were all nominally dignity cults. It is well to remember that such cults can characterize H-B societies as well as D-B. After all, they are derived from cults of honor, which had their origin in honor-based societies.

The Caudillo

The caudillo pattern is actually an example of an as if *ad hoc* office, meeting the chief criterion that a concentrated authority or power is put in place (often temporarily, though not by the caudillo's choice), to accomplish for society what otherwise would not be possible. As with other offices (civil and professional), it is an "institution" for influencing society at large. Specifically, the caudillo pattern features potential clients who offer their allegiance in return for occasional favors. These are not, however, favors as a considered social obligation, but instead acts that ordinarily (with exceptions), reassure the client that his dependence on the caudillo serves the ends of personal and family security in an uncertain world.

This has resulted in an epithet for the institution: "the mendicancy of influence." Given the nature of authority to aggrandize upon the powers of office, however, we might as well add to mendicancy the more dangerous term "mendacity." As Jean-Francois Revel spent a great deal of effort detailing,⁴⁶ this kind of mendacity absent any real sincerity accounts for most totalitarian motivations. Having originated deep within the bowels of culture, these institutions are not easily evaded, let alone overcome (even though any given caudillo may be overthrown).

When these offices were translated into military terms – armed militias under a common landlord – the last major step was in place such that men on horseback (cadillos), could now constitute the hub of a social pattern, that of *caudillaje*, the four features of which are:⁴⁷

- 1) The repeated emergence of armed patron-client sets, cemented by personal ties of dominance and submission, and by a common desire to obtain wealth by force of arms;
- 2) The lack of institutionalized means for succession to offices;
- 3) The use of violence in political competition; and
- 4) The repeated failures of incumbent leaders to guarantee their tenures as chieftains.

In elective politics there exists a collective presumption favoring a given caudillo: the assurance of order. "The authority ... like that of all the caudillos ... was based on the *unconscious suggestion* of our majority. Our people ... instinctively followed the strongest, the bravest and the smartest, whose personality had become a legend in the popular imagination and from whom the people expected absolute protection."⁴⁸ Seemingly "free and fair" elections thus produce dictators.

Stalin and his Russia serve as an example of the caudillo type, less the reliance on horses. We note that Russia was, then and now, an intermediate composite class of H-B society with a cult of dignity at the top level of society and governance. The following trait descriptions are from Herrman.⁴⁹

Quiet traits: 1) a conscious preoccupation with trust versus mistrust; 2) apprehension that people may not be what they outwardly seem; 3) penitent for acting out, they were not punitive toward

46) Revel, *Deceit in the Age of Information*.

47) Wolf and Hansen, "Caudillo Politics," 63.

48) Smith, "The Search for Legitimacy," 93.

49) Herrman, "The Classification of Honor-Based Societies," 25.

themselves for such failings; 4) authority will begin with persuasion; 5) they feel their way through idealistically-focused situations rather than rigorously thinking them through; 6) dependence on loving protection and security ... in relations with formal authority figures; and above all 7) a profound acceptance of group membership and relatedness along with a preoccupation with offering food together with hospitality.

Loud traits: 1) not at all of a compulsive disposition to or for regularity, order, or self-control; 2) high degree of expressiveness and emotional “aliveness”; 3) typified by great volubility with emphasis on singing (occasionally see in quiet groups however); 4) an outstanding trait is said to be “contradictoriness”; and “ambivalence”; 5) willingness to offer and entrust confidences despite the risks; and 6) open willingness to offer criticism or express anger.

Stalin could expect and exact dependencies from his minions (Vasily Blokhin, e.g.). And because the caudillo prerogatives reflect long-standing cultural habits, it is taken for granted that the caudillo has the right to assert an elevated dignity and to expect immunities. In addition, Stalin undertook excursions with the vilest forms of violence. Only a caudillo gets away with that (Hitler also comes to mind).

The Modern H-B Societies⁵⁰

Insecurity and Bravado

- There are examples of the “Cargo” mentality: a fancied deservedness for desirables that advanced cultures have not truly merited and which they should share or otherwise make available – as good an explanation as any to account for China’s determination to thief intellectual property by any means possible.
- There is a premium on the self-respecting, high-souled, generous, and proudly ambitious man; the ideal is for leadership, nobility of manner, and honesty in personal dealings; placing one’s good name, social image, and rank above all else; wealth reflects importance, while the misdeeds of the wealthy often remain invisible. A marked disinclination to air dirty laundry (the Western position allows this as expected from a doctrine of accountability, as least as an ideal).
- A motto appropriate for Russians and various South American elites: “Eat the cake, keep it, sacrifice little, and change even less” (also a great motto for a cult of dignity).⁵¹
- Once having learned the Western concept of “dignity” the honor-based come to thoroughly identify with it, as if it encapsulated much of their cultural *Weltanschauung*.
- A disposition to strongly identify with national figures and groups earning prominence; states will imitate Western constitutional ideals and then occasionally ignore them.
- Persons or groups will occasionally goad a dignity-based person or group into uncomfortable or discomfiting positions as a game of one-upmanship.

Institutions and Statism

- Institutions tend to be populist, oligarchic, and/or dogmatic and are typically plagued with social and racial prejudices. Class inequalities may or may not become prominent.
- Status differentials are often stressed even in the absence of discrepancies in living standards.

50) Modified from “The Classification of Honor-Based Societies,” 8–10.

51) Véliz, *Gothic Fox*., 203–204.

- They are moderate to very nationalistic; there is occasionally a felt deservedness to cut a figure on the international stage; they can be found willing to accept remarkable deficiencies in basic rights in order to achieve a perceived stability and order in a difficult world. Perceived identity is increasingly important.
- An occasional predilection for cultivated overt or indirect aggression to achieve goals;⁵² other advanced cultures – just because they *are* advanced – are sometimes seen as a threat to security or culture.
- Many of today's *transitional* (or in between) H-B cultures favor the D-B politico-legal forms that guarantee rights, while favoring a communitarian lifestyle. They remain in part H-B owing to a continuing special reliance on respect, trust and merited worth.

Personality and Relations

- A happy-go-lucky *Weltanschauung* is sometimes easily punctured by projected slights. It is occasionally common to seek control over others though manipulation. An especially solicitous regard for children that makes a few dignity-based persons seem Puritanical or uncaring. Personality more closed in cooperative, more open in competitive.
- A love of expression, especially eloquence, dance, and song. A strong tendency to utilize symbolism to reveal deep feelings.
- Self-help is the established method of avoiding dependence and expressing independence. Independence also implies staying out of others' disputes and expecting them to care for themselves. In some societies the poor and beggars are not infrequently removed from public areas, and the ailing (in public) are frequently ignored.
- Quarrelsomeness is expected in some quiet competitive groups as well as the intermediate and loud classes.
- "Those forms of behavior which involve self-control rather than endurance, measurement rather than unstinted giving or taking, or calculation rather than immediate response to a situation [are] extremely undeveloped."⁵³ This is a bit severe, but carries some truth. Note that the first word of each pairing is characteristic of the D-B.

The usual honor-based society in the world today is either perfectly comfortable in its skin, or it is fighting to retain its self-identification, or working toward a D-B philosophy, or back-pedaling from a quasi- or actual D-B culture back to a state recapitulating older H-B traits. Most of these societies are either intermediate composite with or without a dignity cult, or they are of the loud category (dignity cult and/or caudillo).

Looking over the last few hundred years of social history it has become apparent that the honor-based societies (more and more individualistic by and large, and featuring political factions with significant power), seem somehow prone to totalitarian rule. The reasons can be briefly summarized in carryovers from the quiet societies and from the intermediate composite: 1) a long-standing tendency for the population to allow and favor dependence on authoritarian groups, political or otherwise, and 2) an increasing stress on the felt perception that order and tranquility require top-heavy restraints and protective capabilities.

Francis Fukuyama has correctly characterized the situation:

In 1970 there were only about 35 electoral democracies, a number that steadily increased over the next three decades until it reached nearly 120 by the early 2000's. Since the mid-2000's, however,

52) Gay, *The Cultivation of Hatred*.

53) Mead, "Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority," 191.

the trend has reversed itself. Populist leaders seek to use the legitimacy conferred by democratic elections to consolidate power. They claim direct charismatic connection to “the people,” who are often defined in narrow ethnic terms that exclude big parts of the population. They don’t like institutions and seek to undermine the checks and balances that limit a leader’s personal power in a modern liberal democracy: the courts, the legislature, an independent media, and a nonpartisan bureaucracy. To propel themselves forward, such figures latched onto the resentments of ordinary people who felt that their nation or religion or way of life was being disrespected. Unless we can work our way back to more universal understandings of human dignity, we will doom ourselves to continuing conflict.⁵⁴

Samuel P. Huntington once declared that the world was headed for a “clash of civilizations.”⁵⁵ His thesis was that states brandishing theological dicta (Islam in particular) were the principal source of disturbances that would enmesh the world in a fateful clash of cultures. The notion of a “clash” is accurate enough, but it will be between H-B and D-B cultures that it materializes. Part of the evidence for this thesis comes from illiberal democracies that are reverting from D-B to H-B principles, the latter of which are not the favorable ones that we all admire; rather, they entail xenophobia and racism while also diluting the political features of the D-B society. They are outwardly spurning what the D-B take pride in.

What is bothersome here is that D-B societies as presently constituted are far from the D-B ideal, some having aspects better considered as cults of dignity. Certainly, however, the “rule of law” is an ideal fundamental to any D-B society, a rule known everywhere as a necessity if all are to be treated with equal dignity. Some of these illiberal societies appear to be leaving this rule in the rear-view mirror.⁵⁶ Another factor continues to be the specter of Islamophobia along with the related reality that Islamic fundamentalists are still hoping to foment reactions against the West, home of the D-B cultures.

There is a saying that democracies rarely if ever make war with one another, whereas non-democratic states frequently war among themselves. This is true enough, but the reason seems to lie with the reality that these democracies are, one and all, D-B cultures, meaning that one does not so much identify with factors likely to arouse enmity with other democracies, whereas H-B cultures can find ways in which they feel that D-B societies disrespect them, even when the contrary is actually the case. Research exists to suggest that “normative beliefs were more important for people’s judgments and behavior in collectivistic than individualistic societies.”⁵⁷ But collectivistic cultures are nearly always H-B, and individualistic cultures are more likely than not to be D-B. Normative beliefs now feature those written about by, for example, Rousseau and Johann Gottfried von Herder⁵⁸ – concern for the nation, for ethnic identity and purity, recognition of and respect for the *volk*, or people.

54) Fukuyama, *Identity*; x–xi, xv–xvi.

55) Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*.

56) Hungary’s Orbán “sought to break the mold of liberal democratic rule by unilaterally re-writing the country’s Constitution; removing independent checks on the power of the executive; undermining the independence of the judiciary; using both public and private media to saturate the public sphere with governmental propaganda and stifle critical voices and substantive political debate.” Szombati, “Authoritarian Populism to Authoritarian Statism in Hungary.”

57) Stamkou et al., “Cultural Collectivism and Norm Violators.” See also Cialdini et al., “Compliance with a Request.”

58) For Rousseau, consult *The Social Contract* and *Emile*; for Herder, see *Reflections of the Philosophy of the History of Mankind*.

Conclusion

Most people as well as most nation-states will manifest both types of cultural traits. Rather than confusing matters, understanding this reality will help each culture learn to appreciate the other. With a broad brush, cultures can be classified not just as H-B or D-B but also to the extent that they are quiet or loud, cooperative, or competitive. The inchoate existence of dignity exists in the cults of honor – in the offices – in the mode of proto-D-B traits. In the full form, dignity applies the four stewardship principles based upon universal inherent dignity and worth. Everyone, and anything of significant value, is treated in accordance with those principles.

While religious belief is a part of the current problems between the cultural types, the enmity goes beyond this to reflect a general notion among H-B societies that the D-B approach does not reflect their cultural values and indeed that it has become a threat to their continuation owing to the dominant position of most D-B societies in the world economic and political spheres. This is true both between nation-states and between some pockets of a subgroup H-B culture and the D-B majority. From this writer's perspective, it is possible to combine the best parts of the two primary cultural types. One can have comparative cultural purity and still uphold the rule of law in a democratic government. The electorate of today's illiberal democracies require a better understanding of the dignity-based doctrines in order to realize that they exist to improve life and that there is nothing a collective society cannot do under a dignity-based regime. At the same time, the dignity-based adherents require a better understanding of the needs and benefits of the honor-based outlook.

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