

DOI:10.14394/eidos.jpc.2025.0016

Rasius Makselis
Lithuanian Culture Research Institute, Vilnius, Lithuania
<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6287-7922>
rasius.makselis@lkti.lt

From the Struggle for Freedom to a Culture of Liberty: Philosophical Reflections on the Lithuanian Experience of the Liberation Movement

Abstract:

This paper discusses the liberation process of Lithuanian society that led to the restoration of independence in 1991, followed by three decades of integration into Western democratic liberal economies. It focuses on the predominant emotional responses and experiences of Lithuanian society as it faced historical choices – such as participating in the constitutional referendum of 1992 – which initiated the transformation of its economy and society, and strategically redefined the very idea of freedom. Consequently, the negative notion of freedom as liberation from the oppressive USSR regime was transformed into a positive concept: the freedom to build a civil society, where universal human rights are protected. This multifaceted interpretation of freedom aligned with the diverse motivations for seeking independence. While part of Lithuanian society viewed independence as the realization of historical justice, others – presumably non-Lithuanian members of society – were more motivated by the future possibilities offered by a democratic society, open borders, and a liberal economy. In this context, the paper raises the question of a possible symbolic future vision for Eastern Europe and argues that the Lithuanian experience of the liberation process can serve as an argument in favor of preserving democratic values when facing contemporary geopolitical challenges.

Keywords:

Eastern Europe, Lithuania, Sąjūdis, liberation movement, freedom, democracy

Does the term “Eastern Europe” signify a certain cultural value? Obviously, the answer is yes. Semantically, it implies an orientation, a direction of perspective (from the center or from the West). It is characterized by potential diversity reminiscent of the way in which Jacques Derrida described Europe as “one but many.”¹ It is not only a diversity of languages, cultures, and religions, but also a diversity of topographical orientations. Take for example Lithuania, one of the Baltic States. It was North for the ancient Romans, it is South for the other two Baltic States, East for Poland and Western Europe, West for Russia and the Soviet Union. This is not just some trivial geographical relativity of the territory of a particular country. Each direction, each perspective, resonates a certain register of cultural and historical identity that has its own semantics, grammar, and pragmatics. The different layers of this identity talk or do not talk to each other, negotiate, conflict, ignore, or tolerate each other. Sometimes, in situations of historical and geopolitical changes, they become very clearly polarized, mobilized around a narrative that unites one or another nation and society, which at the same time expresses a common interpretation of a shared vision of the historical past and future, and at the same time gives it a vital energy, motivating individuals to identify with it. Therefore, the term “Eastern Europe” not only identifies a unique *topos*, but also expresses a value vector that very clearly indicates what is the reference point against which we measure our unique “Easternness” – this is exactly the West and Europe. However, it might be suggested, that strategic identification with Western cultural values does not necessarily entail homogenization and polarization of entire national discourse. This paper discusses the experience of 30 years of the Lithuanian liberation movement and the following attempts to integrate into Western democratic world, by not repressing, but on the contrary, capitalizing on coexisting and differing motivations of different groups of society, even programming a transformation from a negative to positive meaning of the notion of freedom itself. It is expected that the presented overview will enrich the context for discussion about possible future of the notion of “Eastern Europe” and its axiological implications.

This discussion is especially relevant when viewing Europe in the present day political context, which includes: the collapse of Francis Fukuyama’s famous vision

1) Derrida, *The Other Heading*, 38–40.

of the end of history,² the conspicuous end of “Pax Americana,”³ unprecedented challenges both for North Atlantic Alliance and security situation in Europe, and the threat to the principles and validity of international law, trans-national organizations, and even democratic values themselves in Europe and globally. It might be suggested that these and other contemporary global challenges can be transformed into opportunities only on the condition of finding or constructing a theoretical and political vantage point from which cultural and axiological visions of the future of Europe do not clash, but converge. Lithuanian experience suggests, that this common vision, even if possibly propelled by different motivations, could become the basis for building new cultural and political alliances within Europe and globally.

1. Cathartic Euphoria of Liberation

The Lithuanian narrative of national liberation is deeply rooted in a longstanding tradition of statehood, national resilience, and cultural identity. Lithuania first emerged as a sovereign political entity in the thirteenth century under the reign of King Mindaugas and later developed into a significant Eastern European state as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and subsequently as part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This early experience of sovereignty laid the foundations for a strong national consciousness that endured even after the loss of statehood to the Russian Empire in the late eighteenth century.

Following the end of the First World War, Lithuania regained its independence in 1918. The interwar Republic of Lithuania (1918–1940) represented a formative period of state-building characterized by the development of democratic institutions, the institutionalization of education in the Lithuanian language, and international diplomatic recognition. However, this period of autonomy was abruptly interrupted by a sequence of occupations: first by the Soviet Union in 1940, then by Nazi Germany, and again by the Soviets in 1944.

2) Fukuyama, *The End of History*.

3) Sakai, *The End of Pax Americana*; and DePlato and Minford, *America in Decline*.

Despite the brutal repressions carried out by Soviet authorities, the collective memory of earlier independence remained a powerful mobilizing force. In the late 1980s, the Sąjūdis movement emerged, advocating from its inception for political sovereignty and democratization. The Baltic Way in 1989 – during which approximately two million people joined hands in a human chain spanning Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – demonstrated the shared determination of the Baltic peoples to reclaim their independence.⁴ Lithuania's official declaration of independence on March 11, 1990, was followed by violent attempts by Soviet forces to carry out a military coup in a country that had just declared independence. On January 13, 1991, Soviet troops attacked key sites in Vilnius, including the Press House, the National Television building, and the Television Tower, resulting in the deaths of 14 unarmed civilians and injuries to 702 others. Later that year, on July 31, seven Lithuanian customs officers were brutally executed by Soviet special forces at the Medininkai border post.

The idea of freedom dominated the main narrative for Lithuanian society at the end of the twentieth century.⁵ As the preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania⁶ (adopted by referendum in 1992), clearly implies, the restored independence of the state of Lithuania is the historical realization of the Lithuanian nation, the pivotal moment in the history of its liberation, and the destined and logical realization of historical justice. This emotional state and dynamic of society during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union is not understood well enough, neither in historical geopolitical analyses nor in today's discussions about the prospects for Eastern Europe. The process of liberation gives a nation a subjectivity that claims responsibility to the same degree as freedom. To deny this subjectivity is to condemn the nation to non-existence. Historical experience, memory, and its re-actualization had become the matrix of Lithuania's vision of its freedom at the end of twentieth century. The main motivation for the restoration of independence was historical and cultural: the Lithuanian nation, having endured through the tides of history, is reclaiming its statehood, which is the best way to ensure its vitality

4) UNESCO, "The Baltic Way."

5) See, among others, Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution*, 219–55; Senn, *Lithuania Awakening*, 17–38; Lane, *Lithuania: Stepping Westward*, 87–131.

6) *Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania*.

and cultural continuity. Three decades on, remembering the almost euphoric mood of Lithuanian and Baltic societies united in the pursuit of freedom, one wonders whether this motive of restoring the nation's historical destiny and justice was the only factor consolidating their societies. What did Lithuanian independence mean, for example, to representatives of other nations living in Lithuania? The liberation movement "Sąjūdis" was never a purely ethnic Lithuanian movement; there was strong participation of Russians, Poles, Jews, and other nationalities.⁷ In what ways was the vision of national liberation relevant to them?

This issue takes on an additional dimension in the overall geopolitical context of the late twentieth century. Francis Fukuyama declared the end of history at the very moment when Lithuania had successfully "completed" its history of liberation. The denouement of history might have seemed not only to encapsulate the full drama of the freedom struggles, but also to be a valuable cathartic experience in itself. Finally, freedom has been won, the evil empire has collapsed, historical justice has been restored, what next? A happy ending? The quest for liberation, which is directed solely toward the historical past and finds there its motivation, seems to face a state of deadlock if it is not complemented by other directions of gaze. And again, as it was already noted before, different perspectives are not culturally neutral. They each time imply a certain measure we choose to evaluate ourselves. In the case of Eastern Europe, these are two categories: the West and Europe. In the case of Lithuania in the 1990s, cultural motivation has been transformed into political subjectivity.

A particularly important fact is that the transformation itself did not take place through cultural polarization, but through political and civic projection, surmised and articulated by the inclusive concept of "open, just, and harmonious civil society" in the Lithuanian Constitution and in the law on citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania (adopted by Seimas in 1991), which granted citizenship to every person who was permanently living and working in Lithuania regardless of

7) "Compared with earlier data, the survey (conducted on January 14, 1991 – RM) revealed a marked increase in support for independence among non-Lithuanians, and among Russian-speakers in particular: 98% of Lithuanians, 75% of Russians, 66% of Poles, and 74% of other nationalities approved of the March 1990 declaration of independence" (Miniotaite, "Nonviolent Resistance in Lithuania," 51–52).

their nationality.⁸ In simple terms, this political and civic projection could be put as follows: driven by historical and cultural motivations, we first and foremost claim the right to a voice. This voice speaks simultaneously to an internal and an external audience. The inner audience is invited to identify with the intuition of national identity that was alive despite being hidden from the Soviet authorities. It lived on in the memory of several generations, despite lacking clear linguistic articulation. Often, it was confined to romanticized – sometimes contradictory, yet emotionally compelling – images of a glorious past and courageous, self-sacrificial suffering: for example, legends of heroic medieval warriors battling Teutonic invaders, or the desperate resistance of Lithuanian partisans after the Second World War.⁹ The outward-directed voice spoke the international language of universal human rights.¹⁰ These two trajectories of the inner and the outer voice merged in a projected image that was not directed toward the past but toward the future. A consolidating political proposal for citizens to build a rule of law where fundamental human

8) The role of ethnic minorities in Lithuania's late twentieth century independence movement reveals a rather complex yet ultimately integrative dynamic. Certain segments of the Polish and Russian communities (for example, the movement of Russian speaking pro-soviet people "Yedinstvo" ["Unity"]) expressed a negative attitude toward independence. A part of Polish nationals pursued territorial autonomy for the Vilnius region as an alternative political aim. However, many members of these minority groups actively supported the pro-independence cause. The Jewish community, in particular, strongly endorsed the movement's democratic and national objectives. See Biveinis, and Kasperavičius, *Tautiniai santykiai Lietuvoje*; Popovski, *Citizenship Rights in Lithuania*; Budrytė, *Taming Nationalism?*; Senn, *Nationality Questions in the Baltic*; Bobryk, *Odrodzenie narodowe Polaków*; Jundo-Kaliszewska, *Zakładnicy historii*; Sirutavičius, "Perestroika, Sąjūdis, 11 March 1990"; and Toleikis, "New Lithuanian Jewish Community."

9) Streikus, *The Unknown War*.

10) There is an important historical, legal, and philosophical backdrop for the theme of universal human rights in the context of Lithuanian liberation movement. The project of the new text of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania was prepared by an established working group comprising members of Lithuanian societies of lawyers and philosophers (Sinkevičius, "1992 m. Konstitucijos rengimas"). As it is evident from the recorded documents, discussions among the members of working group reflected implicit unequivocal adherence to the pivotal ideals of European democracy, which are discussed in length by Przemysław Bursztyka in his programming article on the actuality of the concept of Eastern Europe (Bursztyka, "Reconceptualizing Eastern Europe," 80–82.) These ideals are: rationality, individual subjectivity, democracy, civil society. The author highlights crucial cultural, political, and ethical aspects that underscore the relevance of these ideals to the historical development of Central and Eastern European nations.

rights and freedoms are protected. The proposal put the existing contradictions, tensions, and potential conflicts in the context of all-encompassing perspective of the main strategic objective. It did not matter at the time that citizens perceived the image differently, and did not have a sufficiently clear understanding of all the implications of the “rule of law.”

The referendum agreed by the majority to follow a common path, and along the way it would be possible to work out where that path should ultimately lead. Together, we resolved to build a democratic rule of law where human rights, including the individual’s freedom to pursue their own well-being, would be protected. So, it turns out that this is not only a positive appreciation for a successful defense of freedom, but also a proposal for the future: a vision that unites citizens no longer on an ethnic basis, but on a legal one. It is this vision of an individual freedom in a restored state that has probably become an important motivation for those Lithuanian nationalities (predominantly Poles, Russians, and Jews), for whom the narrative of the historical realization of the nation was not the primary motive for joining the freedom struggle. It may be suggested, that it was precisely the absence of historical motivation among non-Lithuanian supporters of independence that became the catalyst for the transformation of the negative notion of freedom (“to break free from the USSR”) into a positive notion of freedom (“to create a life for ourselves”).¹¹ This transformation, as reflected in the Lithuanian Constitution’s preamble, underscores the importance of pluralistic motives and perspectives inherent in society when facing decisions that affect its very subjectivity.

2. Lithuanian Eschatology at the End of History

Of course, this march for freedom has not always been perceived as unconditionally victorious. More than one politician has uttered the almost eschatological words: “we are returning to the company of free states, but if it is necessary to die together with them in the struggle for freedom, so be it.” The vein of fatalism

11) See a discussion about a pivotal role of humanities in enabling, ensuring, and safeguarding this positive freedom of expression and creation in Makselis, “Apie gimtojo žodžio laisvę.”

runs very deep in the Lithuanian *psyche*. The motifs of the tragedy of Pilėnai, the death of legendary duke Margiris¹² (who chose death instead of captivity), the reflection on the decades-long resistance struggle of the partisans during the twentieth century (and the hopelessness of that struggle), and the imagery of Lithuania as the land of Mary, the “tear in the eye of God,” still stir the imagination of Lithuanians even today. The trauma of the Soviet occupation of 1940 is exacerbated by the sense of guilt and shame at not confronting it militarily and opting for a pragmatic survival strategy, adapting to, to quote today’s pronouncements, “new geopolitical realities.”

Lithuanian eschatology has also another important component, based on a kind of self-positioning in European history. Just as Lithuanians are proud to call themselves the last pagan nation of Europe, so too at the end of the twentieth century they became a young liberal democracy, just at the time when Fukuyama proclaimed “The End of History,” which presumably marked the global triumph of liberal democracy. Thus, we may say, as in the fourteenth century, so in the twentieth century, Lithuania has jumped into the last carriage of the moving train of European history. When Lithuania officially embraced Christianity in 1387, Renaissance humanism, with its characteristic seeds of secularization, was already spreading in Italy, and after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, a free Lithuania was drawn into the convergence of post-industrial capitalism and its transformation into a global post-modern economy of knowledge and creativity.

12) The name of Margiris was recorded by Wigand of Marburg (1365–1409), a German diplomat and author of the *Chronicle of Prussia*. One surviving excerpt from the chronicle recounts the tragic events at the Samogitian stronghold of Pilėnai. According to the chronicle, during the 1336 assault on Pilėnai by the Teutonic Order, the defenders – realizing that they could not withstand the enemy – chose death over capture. An old woman is said to have killed a hundred men with an axe before taking her own life with the same weapon. Margiris, the commander of the castle, killed his wife and then disemboweled himself with a sword. The heroic image of Margiris has inspired various works of art. His death was portrayed in the painting “The Death of Margiris at Pilėnai” by nineteenth-century Polish painter Władysław Majeranowski (1817–1874). Polish poet and translator of Lithuanian descent Władysław Syrokomla (1823–1862) wrote a poem titled “Margiris,” and Lithuanian composer Vytautas Kłova (1926–2009) composed “Pilėnai,” the most popular Lithuanian opera.

3. The Need for Symbolic Openness for the Common Future

The step toward freedom in 1991 symbolically became a leap beyond the end of history, and it is not surprising that immediately after the restoration of independence, there was a sharp need for a concretization of new strategic vision. This was met by the ambition to become a member of NATO and the EU (which was realized in 2004), the introduction of the Euro in 2015, and an ambition to reach the EU's average level of development. Since the 2008 financial crisis, Lithuanian governments were restless, and developing new long-term national strategies: "Lithuania 2030,"¹³ and "Lithuania 2050."¹⁴ Interestingly, these strategies do not set goals for fundamental qualitative change, but define incremental quantitative growth targets. It is as if, at the end of history, liberal democracy no longer has any landmarks to offer for qualitative change, only incrementally increasing freedom in all spheres of life, which must automatically create the common good, or to quote our President, the "welfare state." Nothing new and nothing too interesting as it was promised already by the Constitution, just in other words, adopted over 30 years ago. Even when, according to the EU's own incremental growth indicators, Lithuania's GDP per capita overtook that of Greece, Portugal, and Spain – this achievement went largely unnoticed by the public.

The technocracy, bureaucracy, and experts who calculate the indicators of growth strategies and programs – being the only ones capable of interpreting the numbers – can hardly inspire society toward a common strategic vision. Perhaps for this reason, its fragmentation, supported by social bubbles, is accelerated by conspiracy theories, pseudo-scientific ideas, and the ideologies and images of radicalized social groups. In the absence of unifying symbols, the allure of power and decisive action tends to grow stronger – a tendency that was vividly and alarmingly demonstrated in the outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election. The ideals of tolerance, diversity, and the primacy of human rights were set aside in favor of promises to resolve long-standing conflicts with a single stroke, to "drain the swamp" of the so-called deep state, and to suppress the economies of unfriendly nations through drastic tariffs, among other measures.

13) "Lietuvos pažangos strategija."

14) "Valstybės ateities vizija."

In contrast, Lithuania's own historical experience illustrates the effectiveness of a very different approach. Looking back, it was precisely the country's inclusive vision – one that embraced diverse motivations for pursuing independence – that proved successful. This internal openness to the varied aspirations of a multifaceted society reflected a rational commitment to democratic values. These values ultimately served as the foundation for the collective decision reached in the constitutional referendum. With this experience in mind, one can pose an important question: What vision of Eastern Europe's future could become the foundation of its identity? Can the category of "Eastern Europe" transform from a historical¹⁵ into a strategic geopolitical category thanks to such a symbolic vision of the future? And what would be its philosophical and ideological content?

If we return to today's Lithuania in its national and geopolitical contexts, which cross-perspectives of the evaluative gaze does it fall into today? If we ask Lithuanian politicians, they will think that we live in a functional democracy, a market economy, where human rights are respected and European values are professed. The public, especially in the rural areas, will point to the high levels of poverty and social exclusion, and the emptying of villages and towns. Looking at Lithuania from the West, one would like to see the exemplary success of the Singing Revolution, the now partly forgotten "Baltic Tigers," and the triumph of liberal democracy. From an Eastern perspective, particularly that of a philosopher and a prominent voice of contemporary Russian ideology Alexander Dugin, it is unsettling to consider that Lithuania, together with its Catholic neighbor Poland, is viewed as a historical and geopolitical anomaly. According to Dugin, these nations would be better erased from history or pushed out to sea, as they are obstacles to the restoration of the Russian Empire and its transformation into a Eurasian world power.¹⁶

15) "The category of Eastern Europe is a historical category," (Bursztyka, "Reconceptualizing Eastern Europe," 68).

16) "One must admit that this problem has no positive solution at all, as it is formulated as follows: either the Polish-Lithuanian space will exist as an independent geopolitical reality (and then it will become an insurmountable obstacle on the path to pro-Eurasian Baltic unity with an axis in Prussia), or its fragments will be integrated into other geopolitical blocs, and it will be dismembered and crushed in the bud," (Dugin, *Основы геополитики*, 214).

The symbolic value of the intersection of these perspectives is extremely high, as is unfortunately the cost. After the failed color revolutions, Arab Spring, and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the belief in the universality of liberal democracy would be definitively shattered if the march of Lithuania and the Baltics to the post-historical realm of capitalism were to tragically end in a new occupation and dictatorship of the East. The history of the US as the leader of the free world and the cornerstone of a global order of democratic values would also end. One could say that the technical aspect of defense of NATO's Eastern flank and the risk of the military vulnerability of the Eastern European region is a lesser problem than the global symbolic collapse of democratic values. In this sense, the currently heating up borderline zones around the world are starting to resonate together: alongside the Baltic States, we look at the Middle East, Taiwan, and the Korean peninsula. Borderline zones are becoming seismic zones.

Is it not the case that today the whole of Eastern Europe is becoming a seismic zone that has a unique symbolic value in a global context? If so, what images of it are still relevant today: the Union of Small Homelands by Stanislaw Vincenz,¹⁷ or Czeslaw Milosz's Central Europe as a polycultural space, a mediator and translator between West and East?¹⁸ Or rather is this the time when bridges must be burnt, the NATO shield must be raised for protection, a new line must be drawn, new walls must be built, and we must try to find ourselves on the right side of it, while at the same time, doing everything possible to ensure that Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia emerge and also stay on the right side of it?

From the East, according to Dugin and his followers, it seems that no cultural translation is needed anymore; our region should become the homogenized periphery of the "Russian World" or at least a scorched "no-man's land," a buffer zone, whose necessity for the East would be, again, not so much practical as symbolic: to discourage people in Europe and worldwide from trusting their own power and rationality, leading them to sacrifice their subjectivity, to abandon their "little homelands," to polarize and identify with the global mystical forces of good and evil, and to become a part of a new multipolar world order.

17) Vincenz, *Na wysokiej połoninie*.

18) Miłosz, *The Witness of Poetry*.

4. Conclusion

It is hard to avoid the suspicion that the fate of Eastern Europe currently depends not on the philosophical consistency of its conception but on the development of concrete historical geopolitical events: how and when the war in Ukraine will end, whether it will escalate into a regional, continental, or even global conflict; what consequences the years of Donald Trump's presidency in the USA will have for the region's future; what will be the effects of the increasingly strong sentiments of US self-isolation, and of unabated political fragmentation within the European Union. Despite the rising threats, one is inclined to conclude that the experience of Lithuania's and all of Eastern Europe's march toward freedom in recent decades can be presented as a powerful argument against prophecies of the imminent sunset of democracy, nation-states, international law, and liberal economics.

Bibliography:

Biveinis, Povilas, and Algimantas P. Kasperavičius. "Tautiniai santykiai Lietuvoje 1988–1992 metais." *Lietuvos istorijos studijos* 20, (2007): 64–84.

Bobryk, Adam. *Odrodzenie narodu Polaków w Republice Litewskiej 1987–1997*. Toruń: Dom Wydawniczy DUET, 2005.

Budrytė, Dovilė. *Taming Nationalism?: Political Community Building in the Post-Soviet Baltic States*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.

Bursztyka, Przemysław. "Reconceptualizing Eastern Europe: Toward a Common Ethos." *Eidos. A Journal for the Philosophy of Culture* 7, no. 3 (2023): 67–101.

Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. <https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalActPrint/lt?jfwid=x4249kwzg&documentId=TAIS.239805&category=TAD>.

DePlato, Justin P., and Alex C. Minford. *America in Decline: How the Loss of Civic Virtue and Standards of Excellence Is Causing the End of Pax Americana*. London: Lexington Books, 2021.

Derrida, Jacques. *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe*. Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas. Indiana University Press, 1992.

Dugin, Alexander. *Основы геополитики [The Foundations of Geopolitics]*. Moscow: Arktogeta, 1997.

Eidintas, Alfonsas, Alfredas Bumblauskas, Antanas Kulakauskas, and Mindaugas Tamošaitis. *The History of Lithuania*. Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2013.

Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press: 1992.

Jundo-Kaliszewska, Barbara. *Zakładnicy historii: Mniejszość polska w postradzieckiej Litwie*. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2019.

Lane, Thomas. *Lithuania: Stepping Westward*. London: Routledge, 2001.

"Lietuvos pažangos strategija 'lietuva 2030'" ["Lithuanian Progress Strategy 'Lithuania 2030'"]. (Admitted 11/23/2011). Adopted by Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas, Res. XI-2015, "Dėl Valstybės pažangos strategijos 'Lietuvos pažangos strategija

“lietuva 2030” patvirtinimo,” (Approved 5/15/2012), (Invalid, Expired on 12/29/2023). Published in *Valstybės žinios*, 2012-05-30, Nr. 61-3050. <https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/TAIS.425517?jfwid=111of23iea>.

Lieven, Anatol. *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993.

Makselis, Rasius. “Apie gimtojo žodžio laisvę: šiuolaikiniai iššūkiai lituanistikai ir humanistikai” [“About the Freedom of the Mother Tongue: Contemporary Challenges for Lithuanian Studies and the Humanities”]. *Logos* 97, (2018): 153–66.

Miłosz, Czesław. *The Witness of Poetry*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.

Miniotaite, Grazina. “Nonviolent Resistance in Lithuania: A Story of Peaceful Liberation.” In *Nonviolent Conflict and Civil Resistance*. Edited by Sharon Erickson Nepstad. Emerald Publishing, 2012.

Naoki, Sakai. *The End of Pax Americana: The Loss of Empire and Hikikomori Nationalism*. Durham and London: Duke University Press 2022.

Popovski, Vesna. *National Minorities and Citizenship Rights in Lithuania, 1988–93*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.

Senn, Alfred Erich. *Lithuania Awakening*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990.

—. “Nationality Questions in the Baltic: The Lithuanian Example.” In *Global Convulsions: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationalism at the End of the Twentieth Century*. Edited by Winston A. van Horne. State University of New York Press, 1997: 247–61.

Sinkevičius, Vytautas. “1992 m. Konstitucijos rengimas: to laikotarpio užrašų fragmentai” [“Drafting of the 1992 Constitution: Passages from the Notes of that Period”]. *Jurisprudencija* 19, no. 3 (2012): 889–906.

Sirutavičius, Vladas. “On the Polish National and Territorial Autonomy in Lithuania (Spring–Summer of 1991).” *Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 52, no. 1 (2017): 163–95.

—. “Perestroika, Sąjūdis, 11 March 1990, and the Lithuanian Jews.” In *The History of Jews in Lithuania: From the Middle Ages to the 1990s*. Edited by Vladas Sirutavičius, Darius Staliūnas, and Jurgita Šiaučiūnaitė-Verbickienė, 455–69. Paderborn: Brill/Schöningh, 2020, 455–69.

Streikus, Arūnas, ed. The Unknown War: Anti-Soviet Armed Resistance in Lithuania 1944–1953. Routledge, 2022.

“Valstybės ateities vizija ‘Lietuva 2050’” [“Vision of the State’s Future ‘Lithuania 2050’”]. Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybė [Government of the Republic of Lithuania]. <https://lrv.lt/lt/lietuva-2050/>.

Vincenz, Stanisław. *Na wysokiej połoninie*. Tomy I–IV. Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1980–1986.

Toleikis, Vytautas. “Some Remarks on the History of the New Lithuanian Jewish Community: The Road Travelled in Establishing a Litvak Identity.” In *Jews in the Former Grand Duchy of Lithuania since 1772*. Edited by Šarūnas Liekis, David Levin, and Helmut Safrian. Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2013, 405–16.

UNESCO. “The Baltic Way – Human Chain Linking Three States in Their Drive for Freedom.” Memory of the World. <https://www.unesco.org/en/memory-world/baltic-way-human-chain-linking-three-states-their-drive-freedom>.



This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/> or send a letter to Creative Commons, PO Box 1866, Mountain View, CA 94042, USA.