In this paper free volitions are construed as a subclass of reflective judgements in the Kantian meaning, i.e. judgements not involving any fixed concepts but displaying a concept-like form. Judgements expressing volitions and issuing in action may be termed volitional judgements, therefore free volitions are construed as reflective volitional judgements. Due to an element of conceptual novelty and the fact that in a reflective judgement volition gets conceptually fixed out of an unstable equilibrium between different conceptualizations, free volitions thus construed seem to be apt candidates for causally undetermined events.
determinism, free will, freedom, incompatibilism, Kant, reflective judgement
How to cite:
Poręba, Marcin. “Freedom, Symmetry Breaking and Reflective Judgements. An Attempt at an Incompatibilist Account of Freedom.” Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture 1, no. 1 (2017): 67–75. https://doi.org/10.26319/EIDOS-001-FREEDOM.
Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw
Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warsaw, Poland
Dummett, Michael. “Tense and Time.” In Thought and Reality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006.
Dummett, Michael. “The Reality of the Past.” In Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth, 1978.
Goodman, Nelson. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgement. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Allen W. Wood. Connecticut: Yale University Press 2002.
Łukasiewicz, Jan. „On Determinism.” In Selected Works, edited by L. Borkowski, 110–128, Amsterdam/London: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1970.
Łukasiewicz, Jan „On Three-Valued Logic.”, In Selected Works, edited by L. Borkowski, 85–86. Amsterdam/London: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1970.
Łukasiewicz, Jan „Philosophical Remarks on Many-Valued Systems of Propositional.” In Selected Works, edited by L. Borkowski, 53–178. Amsterdam/London: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1970.
Poręba, Marcin. Możliwość rozumu. Ćwiczenia z metafizyki (The Possibility of Reason. Exercises in Metaphysics). Warszawa: Aletheia, 2008.
Spinoza, Benedict de “Letter LVII.” In The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza. Translated by R.H.M. Elwes. London: George Bell and Sons, 1901.
Open Access Statement:
This is an open access journal which means that all content is freely available without charge to the user or his/her institution. Users are allowed to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of the articles, or use them for any other lawful purpose, without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author, as long as the author and original source are properly cited. This is in accordance with the BOAI definition of open access.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. Submitting a text to Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture means that the author agrees with the general conditions of this license. The author does and will maintain copyrights and publishing rights for his/her article without any restrictions.