Abstract:
In this article, I analyze Charles Crittenden’s account of fictional objects in his Unreality: The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects (1991). I argue that Crittenden’s sketchy ontology of fictional objects does not support his weak eliminativism. Going along the lines of Amie Thomasson (1999), I stress that the problem of fictional objects is a strictly ontological problem, which requires an ontological solution. A solution to the problem of fictional objects (or ficta) that accommodates “practice” (ordinary language and literary practices) is of course to be praised, but not when it is foregrounded at the expense of “ontology.” I argue for Roman Ingarden as a champion of ontology and practice, whose way of dealing with ficta fares better than Crittenden’s on both the ontological and practical sides. In short, ficta should be approached as something over and above mere grammaticalia (grammatical objects) namely as “purely intentional” objects that are formally incomplete, and which readers complete by resorting to practices of language and literary criticism.
Keywords:
fictional objects, Roman Ingarden, Charles Crittenden, ontology, ordinary language practices, literary practices
How to cite:
Jakha, Hicham. “Ontology or Practice? An Ingardenian Examination of Crittenden’s Ficta.” Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture 8, no. 2 (2024): 126-157. https://doi.org/10.14394/eidos.jpc.2024.0011.
Author:
Hicham Jakha
The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin
Aleje Racławickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland
https://orcid.org/0009-0002-9936-5220
hicham.jakha@kul.pl
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