Preview: /Review: Graham Harman and Christopher Witmore, Objects Untimely: Object-Oriented Ontology and Archaeology, (Cambridge and Hoboken: Polity Press, 2023), 240 pages./ This is a very unusual book and it is so in several different respects. Firstly, it is co-authored and that already makes it a rare bird in contemporary philosophical output. Secondly, the author…
Abstract: There is a genuine and profound problem about what it consists in for anything to be yourself. Once (perhaps per impossibile) all the empirical and modal facts about a particular human being are in, it still remains unexplained both what being you is, and why that human being is yourself. Being you seems an…
Abstract: The New Atheist movement has been called “fundamentalist” in its allegiance to science. While true that New Atheism is remarkable among the various historical formations of atheism for its championing of the sciences, it is not fundamentalist. Where it does share a resemblance to Christian fundamentalism is in their respective attachments to a salvific epistemology either…
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show how a monastic environment can be regarded as providing shelter for individuals with autism spectrum condition in the Middle Ages. By drawing on the recent literature in the history of medicine that traces the signs and symptoms of ASC in Hildegard of Bingen, a Benedictine abbess from the twelfth century, we will…
Preview: This special issue of Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture follows on from the double special issue on Science and Religion published at the end of last year. This double issue focused primarily on questions in metaphysics and ontology. What several of the contributions have pointed out, however, is that the naturalistic worldview, which…
Abstract: In this article, I analyze Charles Crittenden’s account of fictional objects in his Unreality: The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects (1991). I argue that Crittenden’s sketchy ontology of fictional objects does not support his weak eliminativism. Going along the lines of Amie Thomasson (1999), I stress that the problem of fictional objects is a strictly ontological…